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Abstract in English 
This paper estimates the effects of the formation and development of the Internal Market (IM) 
in the European Union on income per capita for the EU and specifically for the Netherlands, 
since its appearance in 1958. It does so in two stages. First, gravity equations are estimated to 
identify the impact of the IM on bilateral trade in goods and services and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). The results of the first stage show that 8 percent of the exports and imports of 
goods by the EU members can be attributed to the IM. For services trade, the IM effects are 
somewhat smaller: about 5 percent of EU members’ services trade. The IM has a bigger impact 
on FDI stocks. For the Netherlands, the IM has about twice as large an effect on trade in goods 
compared to the results for the EU. For services trade and FDI, the effects are in line with the 
results for the EU. Second, the trade-enhancing effect of IM on GDP is estimated. For 2005, IM 
integration of goods markets has yielded 2 to 3 percent higher per capita income in the EU, and 
about 4 to 6 percent higher income per capita in the Netherlands. If the current level of 
integration effects with respect to the IM for goods and services persists, GDP per capita in the 
long run will increase by about 10 percent in the EU and about 17 percent in the Netherlands. 
 
Key words: European Union, Internal Market, gravity equation, openness and income  
JEL code: F15, F4 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit document presenteert de effecten van de Interne Markt (IM) in de Europese Unie (EU) op 
inkomen in twee stappen. In de eerste stap worden panel-schattingstechnieken toegepast op 
graviteitsvergelijkingen om het IM-effect van de handel in goederen en diensten en 
buitenlandse directe investeringen (DBI) te bepalen. Acht procent van de totale handel in 
goederen door de EU-landen kan worden toegeschreven aan de IM en 5 procent van de handel 
in diensten. De IM heeft een grotere bijdrage aan de DBI-voorraad geleverd. Voor Nederland 
zijn de IM-effecten van de goederenhandel ongeveer twee keer zo groot. De resultaten voor 
dienstenhandel en DBI zijn in lijn met het EU-gemiddelde. De tweede stap identificeert het 
effect van de extra handel op het inkomen. Met betrekking tot goederen heeft de IM ongeveer 
voor 2 tot 3 procent bijgedragen aan het BBP in de EU en voor 4 tot 6 procent in Nederland. Op 
de lange termijn kan het huidige niveau van IM integratie voor goederen en diensten voor bijna 
10 procent aan het BBP in de EU-bijdragen en voor ongeveer 17 procent in Nederland.  
 
Steekwoorden: Europese Unie, interne markt, graviteitsvergelijking, openheid en inkomen 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4 
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Preface 
The Treaty of Rome went into force in 1958: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands had established European Economic Community. One important aim was 
and still is the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. In the European Outlook 5 
of 2007 SCP and CPB described the fifty-year history of integrating goods, services, capital and 
labour markets in Europe. They concluded that market integration is one of the biggest 
successes of the European Union and has contributed to prosperity. This document contributes 
into more depth to that conclusion by first estimating the effects of market integration in the EU 
on goods trade services trade, foreign direct investment. In addition, it examines the effects of 
previous enlargements on the internal market for goods. Second, it estimates the effect of fifty 
years of market integration on income for the EU and separately for the Netherlands. 
 
The document gives a thorough overview on the effects of the Internal Market. The authors 
apply up-to-date empirical methodologies to estimate the economic impact of a very important 
policy domain in Europe. The conclusions support the relevance of IM policy. At the moment, 
about 4 to 6 percent of GDP in the Netherlands can be ascribed to the current stage of IM 
integration. For the EU overall the income effect is about 2 to 3 percent. These incomes gains 
will probably increase because less than half of the long-run income gains have been realized 
yet due to the long transition period between increased market openness and productivity 
changes.  
 
Arjan Lejour, Gert-Jan Linders, Bas Straathof and Jan Möhlmann carried out this project at the 
request of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which also partially funded this project. Cees van 
Duijn and Sjef Ederveen of the Ministry supported the project and have contributed with useful 
comments. CPB colleagues Henri de Groot and Albert van der Horst participated intensively 
with their constructive and stimulating approach. Frank Klaassen of the University of 
Amsterdam has provided valuable comments at a CPB seminar. Comments of CPB colleagues 
Suzanne Kok, Henk Kox and Bas ter Weel also helped to improve this study. 
 
Coen Teulings 
Director CPB   8   9 
Summary 
For more than half a century, members of the European Union (EU) have pursued policies 
stimulating the free movement of goods, services and capital. Most of these policies aim to 
reduce the cost of cross-border transactions, thus fostering what is known as the Internal Market 
(IM). This paper estimates that 8 percent of the exports and imports of goods by EU members 
can be attributed to the IM. This number includes the effect of the IM on trade between 
members and non-members. The Netherlands has experienced a greater impact on trade: in 
2005 the IM contributed 18 percent to Dutch exports and 12 percent to Dutch imports of goods. 
Apart from affecting trade in goods, the IM is also associated with more trade in services 
and more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). About 5 percent of trade in services by the EU15 
can be attributed to the IM and the IM contributed 11 percent to outward FDI and 17 percent to 
inward FDI stocks of the EU15. For the Netherlands the IM effects on services trade and FDI 
are in line with the results for the EU. 
The IM effect for goods is estimated to have increased GDP by about 3 percent for the EU 
and about 6 percent for the Netherlands. In a more conservative scenario in which openness has 
less effect on income, the GDP effects are estimated at 2 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
The integration of capital markets could add slightly to the income effect of trade in goods and 
services. According to our estimations less than half of the long-run income gains have been 
realized yet due to the long transition period between increased market openness and 
productivity changes. The next decades the income effects of the current stage of IM integration 
will accumulate. 
History of the Internal Market 
The development of the IM is closely related to the history of the EU. It has expanded by 
covering more countries and has deepened by more intense cooperation. In 1958, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The treaty envisioned the free movement of persons, goods, capital and 
services between member states. In 1968 a customs union is put in place between the six EEC 
countries, eliminating import duties on imported goods from other member states. Other 
barriers, including quality and safety requirements, remained. 
The Single European Act of 1986 paved the way for harmonisation of regulation, which led 
to completion of the IM for goods (also known as the Single Market). At that time the EU 
already consists of twelve Member States. Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined in 1973, Greece 
in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, 
while in 2004 the internal market expanded from 15 to 25 countries by the accession of the 
countries in Central and East Europe (CEE). Three years later the EU welcomed Bulgaria and 
Romania as members.    10 
Methodology 
We employ a two-step procedure. First, we estimate a gravity equation for bilateral trade to 
identify the contribution of the Internal Market to trade. We want to examine the IM effects on 
bilateral trade in goods and services and on bilateral FDI. The second step estimates the 
contribution of trade openness and foreign investment on income.  
When measuring the effect of EU membership on trade, two difficulties arise. First, trade 
between two countries is affected by many other factors, such as physical distance, adjacency, 
differences in culture and language. This problem has been countered by using panel data 
estimation techniques in order to explain trade in goods and services and FDI.  
Second, by making trade between its members more attractive, the IM could have had a 
negative impact on the trade between members and non-members. This phenomenon is known 
as trade diversion. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have proposed a method to take account 
of this difficulty. Based on recent refinements of their approach, we find that Internal Market 
policies have stimulated trade in goods and services between EU members, while diversion of 
trade with non-members has been limited. This solution is only applicable for trade in goods 
and services. We are not able to correct for possible “investment diversion” due to the Internal 
Market, that is the possibility that firms which invest more in the EU because of the free 
movement of capital invest less in other countries.  
The Internal Market for goods 
The impact of the IM on trade in goods has varied over time, but EU membership has 
consistently been associated with a trade bonus since the 1960s. The first stage of the IM was 
characterised by a rapid expansion of intra-EU trade, culminating in a peak contribution to EU 
trade of about 12 percent of actual trade in 1970. After this first peak, the contribution of the IM 
to trade dropped.  
A second peak was reached in the first half of the 1990s. At this time the share of trade 
attributable to the IM was about 18 percent for EU-members on average. The second peak 
occurred at the time the Single Market was formally completed. During the last decade of our 
data sample, the impact of the IM declined to 8 percent in 2005 for the EU and 18 and 12 
percent for Dutch exports and imports, respectively. In contrast with the EU average, the recent 
decline in the contribution of the IM seems to stabilise for the Netherlands. 
All expansions of the EU have had a positive impact on trade with new members. The 
accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom has had the most profound impact (8 
percent on average), followed by the accession of Spain and Portugal (3 percent). The impact of 
the 2004 expansion has been small until now, but this is not surprising because the time period 
is too short to identify a significant effect. Overall, the expansion of the EU has more impact on 
trade than the deepening of the IM. For Dutch trade expansion and deepening are equally 
important.    11 
The Internal Market for services 
Services trade amounts to about 20% of total trade. Services were often considered to be non-
tradable, and attracted less attention from policy makers. Discriminatory rules based on 
nationality are forbidden in the EU, but services trade is often hampered by national regulation. 
The Services Directive which has to be implemented in 2009 is a recent policy initiative to 
stimulate services trade. 
For bilateral trade in services data are only available since 1999, which makes it impossible 
to estimate the effects of extensions of the EU before that year. The only enlargement within the 
available time series occurred in 2004. Although the length of our data sample is limited, the 
Internal Market has a small, but statistically significant effect on trade in services after 
controlling for other factors using panel data estimation. After accounting for trade diversion, 
we conclude that for the EU15 and the Netherlands about 5 percent of all services trade can be 
ascribed to the Internal Market. The IM effects for services trade are thus smaller than for goods 
trade, which could be explained by the focus on the free movement of goods in IM policy 
making.  
The Internal Market and Foreign Direct Investment 
Before the 1980s international capital movements and in particular FDI was limited. Capital 
controls and other barriers were serious impediments. Also within the EU nearly no policies 
were implemented to improve the free movement of capital. This changed in the 1980s and 
1990s, in particular the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union has been important. 
The free movement of capital is important to allocate capital to those countries where it is most 
productive. In addition, it could increase competition and productivity. 
Using a panel approach, we have estimated the effect of the internal market on bilateral FDI 
stocks. Because we were not able to capture possible substitution effects of domestic and 
investment and FDI in non-EU counties towards FDI in EU countries, the numbers have to be 
considered as an upper bound. For the EU15 17 percent of inward FDI stocks can be ascribed to 
IM and 11% for outward FDI stocks in 2005. For the Netherlands the effects are slightly larger.  
The IM effect on inward stocks is bigger because it includes also inward investment from 
non-EU investors motivated by the attractiveness of IM. Due to the Internal Market, products 
that are produced in one EU country can more easily be sold in other EU countries, which 
benefits horizontal motivated FDI by increasing the market size. The effect of the IM on FDI 
has increased over time. The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Internal Market in 
1995 had a sizeable effect on FDI stocks.   12 
Effects of the Internal Market on income 
International trade increases productivity and economic growth through various channels. 
Openness to trade increases the scale of the market. This increases exposure to foreign 
competition as well as increases the variety of products available both for intermediate use and 
for final consumption. A larger market might thus lead to more specialization and to higher 
productivity. Over time, openness to foreign products may induce spillovers of technological 
knowledge, as embodied in new products. The larger market scale provides incentives for 
investment in research and development, leading to more innovation and technological 
progress. However, the literature on openness and income shows that it can take decades before 
all the benefits of more openness are reaped.  
The trade-enhancing effects of the IM for goods and services is estimated to have increased 
GDP by  about 3 percent of GDP for the EU and 6 percent for the Netherlands. In a more 
conservative scenario in which openness has less effect on income, the income effects are 2 
percent and 4 percent, respectively. For the Netherlands we have excluded re-exports from trade 
for compiling openness changes due to the Internal Market because re-exports generate much 
less value added per euro exported. 
According to our estimations about half of the potential income gains of the current stage of 
IM integration have been realized until now. The other part will be realized the coming decades 
due to reallocation, productivity improvements and innovation. These movements are already 
triggered by IM integration but take a long time before they are materialized. Then the GDP 
effect for the EU could add up to nearly 10% and of the Netherlands to 17%.  
 These long-term income effects are mainly the IM effect of integration goods markets.  The 
IM effect of services market integration adds much less to GDP for two reasons. First of all, the 
trade-enhancing effect of services is about half of the size of that of goods in the EU15. Second, 
services trade contributes only a third to trade openness compared to goods. As a result the 
integration of services markets could add about 1 percent of GDP to the income effect of goods 
market integration for the EU in the long run. For the Netherlands it is nearly 3% because the 
tradability of services is higher.  
   13 
1  Introduction 
For more than half a century, members of the European Union (EU) have pursued policies 
aimed at reducing the cost of cross-border transactions. In 1958 the foundation of the European 
Internal Market (IM) was laid with the establishment of a customs union. Since then EU 
policies have spread to a wide range of policy areas. Agricultural policies have been centralised, 
common product standards related to health and safety have been agreed upon, and many EU 
members have adopted a single currency, the euro. 
The IM has not only grown in terms of depth, but also in terms of width. Fifty years ago it 
comprised just six countries, while currently the number of member states is 27. In addition, the 
EU has inspired other groups of countries to establish free trade areas (fta’s). Examples are the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
Although in many cases the economic reasoning behind the EU’s trade-related policies is 
sound, empirical evidence on the contribution of the IM to its members’ GDP is rather coarse 
and inconclusive. Economic theory prescribes that reductions in trade costs promote the 
efficient allocation of resources and therefore generally improve welfare.
1 A detailed empirical 
confirmation of this intuition, however, has proved to be difficult to obtain. 
The diversity of EU policies, their gradual implementation, and noise caused by a multitude of 
other trade-related events cause cross-section regressions to yield results that wildly vary over 
time. As a consequence, recent studies typically focus on averages over time. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007b), for example, report that between 1960 and 2000 fta membership is 
associated with an increase in intra-fta trade of thirty to sixty percent. 
 
This study aims to provide insight in how IM policies have affected trade and production over 
time.
2 In addition, we track how the accession of new member states has altered trade since the 
first expansion of the EU in 1973. Particular attention is given to the contribution of the IM for 
the Netherlands, a small open economy relying heavily on trade. 
Similar to Frankel and Rose (2002) who estimate the effects of currency unions on trade and 
income, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the effect of EU-membership on bilateral 
trade flows using a gravity equation. Second, we perform a panel regression of GDP on 
openness to trade. Combining the results from these two regressions yields an estimate of the 
EU’s contribution to the GDP of its members. 
The first step uses data on bilateral trade in goods from 1961 to 2005 in order to estimate a 
time-varying effect of EU membership. A possibly substantial problem is that a reduction of 
 
1 Adjustment costs can be substantial and unevenly distributed. 
2 The analysis does not include all effects of EU membership on production, but only those that affect production through a 
reduction of intra-EU trade costs. EU policies like competition policy, cohesion policy, and the Lisbon policies on economic 
reform might have had an impact on production that does not run through this channel. The effects of the EU’s external 
trade policy are also ignored.   14 
trade cost within the EU might not only stimulate trade between members, but that it might also 
lead to a reduction of trade between members and non-members. Lower trade costs within the 
EU simultaneously create trade and divert trade from non-members towards members. For this 
reason, the difference between intra-EU trade and other trade flows overestimates the 
contribution of the EU to trade - even after controlling for country-pair specific characteristics. 
In order to separate trade creation from trade diversion, we follow the theoretical framework 
suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). This allows us to compute time series for all 
trade flows describing the counterfactual situation in which the IM would not have existed, but 
other trends like globalisation would still have taken place. The difference between the 
counterfactual flows and the actual flows then constitutes the effect of the IM on trade. 
The IM is not only relevant for trade in goods, but might also have stimulated trade in 
services and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
3 We analyse trade in services, similarly as trade 
in goods, noting that data on bilateral trade in services are only available for a short period and 
a modest number of countries. For bilateral FDI stocks a slightly modified gravity equation is 
estimated. Because an appropriate theoretical framework is lacking for FDI, no distinction can 
be made between FDI-creation and -diversion. 
The second step of the analysis quantifies the effect of openness on GDP. A panel 
regression is performed in which GDP is regressed on a number of variables including lagged 
GDP and openness to trade (openness measured as imports plus exports divided by GDP). The 
panel is a set of middle and high-income countries followed over five-year periods since 1960. 
The analysis of the first step can be used to compute the contribution of the IM to a country’s 
openness. With the second-step results we calculate both the transitory and steady-state (i.e. 
short term) effects of the IM on GDP. 
 
We find that the IM effect has varied substantially over time. Initially the share of the actual 
trade in goods due to the IM grew rapidly, culminating in a peak in 1970. The next three years 
saw a major setback, but the IM contribution gradually improved again until a second peak in 
the early 1990s. At this time the share of trade attributable to the IM was about 18 percent for 
the EU15 and about 30 percent for the Netherlands. A gradual decline set in afterwards, such 
that the IM-effect is 8 percent of all goods trade for the EU and 18 percent for the Netherlands 
in 2005. We find that trade diversion has been limited to one or two percent of actual trade. 
With regard to the accession of new member states, we conclude that the accession of 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom has had the largest impact (5 percent of actual 
trade). The expansion from 15 to 25 members in 2004 is found to have only had a small impact, 
but this is probably because our dataset has no observations beyond 2005. 
For services and FDI only an IM effect averaged over time has been computed. About 5 
percent of EU15 trade in services is estimated to be attributable to the IM. For the Netherlands 
 
3 We ignore the international movement of labour. The main reason is that until recently (temporary) migration between 
member states has been limited (Dekker et al. (2007)).   15 
the effect is slightly larger. The IM-effect for FDI ranges between 11 and 17 percent of 
outwards and inwards FDI stocks respectively for the EU15 and between 15 and 18 percent for 
the Netherlands. 
In 2005, the effect of the IM on GDP is estimated to be about 3 percent of actual GDP for 
the EU15 and about 6 percent for the Netherlands. Based on the effect of the IM on trade in 
2005, the long-term IM-effect would be 10 percent of GDP for the EU15 and 17 percent of 
GDP for the Netherlands. 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in four respects. First, it is one of the first studies 
that present clear results on how the IM has affected trade over time. Frankel (1997) notes that 
the effect of EU-membership fluctuates from one year to another and suggests pooled 
regression as a solution. Baldwin and Rieder (2007) track the IM-effect in a panel data 
regression with year-specific EU membership dummies, yielding highly fluctuating 
coefficients. In addition, our study identifies specifically the IM effects of previous 
enlargements. 
Second, this paper is the first to employ an Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)-type 
adjustment for trade diversion. In particular, we use an exact solution for Anderson and Van 
Wincoop’s non-linear system of multilateral resistance terms (Straathof (2008)). (We report 
results for linear approximations proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007a) in the appendix). 
Third, we present new results on the relation between openness and economic growth. We 
follow Bond et al. (2001) by applying GMM in order to avoid bias caused by the endogeneity 
of GDP and openness. The contribution of the IM to both the steady state and transitory growth 
of GDP utilizes the time-varying estimates of the IM-effect on trade in goods. 
Fourth, we extend the analysis of the Internal Market for trade in goods to trade in services and 
also to FDI. Most papers focus on trade in goods which is until now the most important part of 
IM, but does not give a complete analysis. This paper broadens the analysis of IM.  
 
This report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a brief history of the Internal Market, 
some descriptive statistics and an overview of the literature on the effects of IM. Chapters 3 to 5 
subsequently investigate the IM effects over time on goods trade, on services trade and on FDI, 
respectively. Chapter 6 reports estimates of the contribution of trade openness to production. 
Chapter 7 summarizes and gives an overall assessment of the main results.   16 
   17 
2  The Internal Market: history and trends
4 
2.1  IM history in a nutshell 
Following the Second World War far-reaching cooperation between European countries was 
upheld as an ideal for the future. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1952 was an important step in stabilising the relation between Germany and France. 
The Benelux countries and Italy also joined. In 1957 the six ECSC countries signed the Treaty 
of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). Improving prosperity 
and closer cooperation between member states are its main aims, and a common market and 
harmonisation of policies of the Member States its main means. The idea of the common market 
is to encompass the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. 
From 1967 onwards, the free movement of goods was simplified by the gradual reduction of 
differences in systems of indirect taxation. In 1968 a customs union is put in place between the 
six EEC countries, eliminating import duties on imported goods from other member states. In 
addition, a common import tariff applies for imports from third countries. Now that the customs 
union is in place, a lack of policy harmonisation proves to be an impediment to further 
integration. Although the Treaty of Rome enshrines the free movement of goods, the member 
states developed few new initiatives. For some time, the main progress came from the European 
Court of Justice, enforcing mutual recognition of product standards in a number of landmark 
cases . 
Europe endeavoured to revitalise European integration by the Single European Act of 1986. 
It aimed to remove all barriers to trade in goods between the member states by 1992. At that 
time the EU already consists of twelve Member States. Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined in 
1973, Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Six years later, the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992) provides for the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union, the foundation for the 
euro. The simplification of payment transactions in the euro-zone forms a major stimulus to all 
four freedoms in the first years of this century. 
In 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) is created, when the member states of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) take part in the internal market.
5 The EFTA was 
established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
Later Iceland (1970) and Finland (1986) joined. Denmark, UK and Portugal had to leave the 
EFTA when these countries joined the EU. This was also the case for Austria, Finland and 
Sweden when these countries joined the EU in 1995. Before the creation of the EEA, the EFTA 
 
4 In particular section 2.1 and 2.2 are based on Dekker et al. (2007) which describes the history of the internal market more 
extensively.  
5 With the exception of Switzerland because the referendum turned out to be negative. In the meantime, Switzerland 
adopted many directives on the internal market. As a result, it has privileged access to the internal market of the EU.   18 
and EEC already abolished tariffs on industrial goods in 1977 and established a broader 
cooperation in 1984 (Luxembourg declaration).
6 
In 2004 and 2007 the internal market expanded from 15 to 27 countries by the accession of 
the countries in Central and East Europe (CEE), Cyprus and Malta. Currently, the internal 
market comprises of about 500 million people. 
2.2  Trade and foreign direct investment developments in the EU
7 
2.2.1  Goods trade 
Figure 2.1 presents the development of intra EU15 trade in goods as a share of value added 
between 1962 and 2004. It increases from 8% in 1962 to about 70% in 2005. The figure 
decomposes also trade developments between existing members of the EU at a certain point in 
time and new members.
8 It shows that EU trade increased because of trade deepening (between 
existing members) and widening (new members). 












































































EU6 EU7-9 EU10 EU11-12 EU13-15 EU16-25  
Trade developments with new members have two causes. The first is the trivial effect that some 
non-EU or extra-EU trade flows becomes intra-EU trade flows after enlargement. The second is 
an increase in the volume of trade in the first years after accession. This result is illustrated in 
 
6 For more information: EFTA (2007), Dekker et al. (2007). 
7 All data material in this section is derived from Dekker et al. (2007), Straathof (2007). 
8 The series “EU6” shows the trade in goods between the six founding members of the EU. The series “EU7-9”, shows the 
increase in intra EU trade following the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. and consists of  all trade 
between the EU7-9 countries as well as the exports to and imports to these countries by the EU6. The series for “EU10”, 
“EU11-12”, etc. are constructed in the same way as the “EU7-9” series.   19 
Table 2.1. The third column reports the yearly growth rates
9 for the ten years following the 
accession of three groups of countries. The first number, for example, is the average yearly 
growth rate over the period 1973 to 1982 of intra-EU trade flows with either Denmark, Ireland 
or the United Kingdom as one of the trading partners. The fourth column reports the growth rate 
of the trade between existing members of the EU: the first growth rate in this column refers to 
intra-EU6 trade, the second to intra-EU10 trade, and the third to intra-EU12 trade. 
The growth in trade with new member states is markedly higher than the growth in trade 
between the rest of the member states. For the enlargement to nine members the difference in 
growth rates exceeds four percentage points, for the enlargement to twelve members the 
difference is almost six percentage points. An exception is the accession of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland. Here, there is no difference in the growth rates of trade. This is not surprising, as these 
countries were already strongly integrated within the EU (e.g. by the EU-EFTA agreements, see 
Section 2.1). 
Table 2.1  Growth in trade with accession countries higher than for old member states 
Accession  Period      Growth ratio intra-EU trade to value  
    added EU15 (% per year) 
       
    Acceding members  Old members 
       
EU6 to EU9  1973-1982  6.2  1.6 
EU10 to EU12  1986-1995  6.7  0.8 
EU12 to EU15  1995-2004  2.3  2.4 
 
The Netherlands is more open to goods and services trade and FDI than the average EU country 
(Dekker et al. (2007)) because it is a relatively small country and the Rotterdam harbour acts as 
a gateway to Europe. Figure 2.2 shows that the ratio of exports of value added is much higher 
than for the EU as a whole (compare to Figure 2.1). This is already the case in 1962 and still 
continues. The bars also show that in the 1960s the non-EU countries were relatively more 




9 Average growth rates have been computed by regressing the log of a series on a time variable indicating the year and a 
constant. Coefficients on the time variable are reported as growth rates. 
10 The first section of the bars marked “to EU6” refers to the Dutch exports to the other five founding members of the EEC. 
The section marked “to EU7-15” are exports to the other EU15 countries. The section “to non-EU15” shows exports to non-
EU15 countries.   20 





































































to EU6 to EU7-15 to non-EU15  
2.2.2  Services trade 
International trade in services amounts about 12% of the value added in services (including 
government services). This is considerably lower than for goods and the openness of services 
grows also much less rapidly. Most of the EU services exports are destined to other EU 
countries (56%) in 2004. The EU6 is the main destination with 29%, second is EU7-9 due to the 
importance of financial services in the UK (16%), and the other EU countries (EU10-25) 
account for at most 10%. 
2.2.3  Foreign Direct Investment 
In 1980, FDI as a share of gross investment was negligible in the EU. Lifting capital controls 
and capital market integration stimulated FDI. It swallowed until its peak in 2000. This peak 
was largely the result of a surge in mergers and acquisitions - especially in the telecom sector. 
Since then, the size of FDI seems to have crumbled but it remained in 2004 at a higher level 
than in the 1990s. In recent years the level of FDI flows picked up again. In the years 1999 and 
2000, a couple of very large acquisitions took place involving UK companies like Vodafone 
AirTouch (USD 203 and 14 billion), ZENECA group (USD 35 billion) and Orange (USD 33 
and 46 billion). These acquisitions are reflected in the large share of EU7-9 in Figure 2.3.   21 
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2.3  The economic effects of the Internal Market 
The economic literature has not yet delivered a clear-cut answer to the benefits of the Internal 
Market. The quantitative studies fall roughly into two categories. The first category covers 
studies using simulations to derive the gains of the economic integration. Typically, the gains 
are static and relatively modest (often do not exceed 2% of GDP).
11 They tend to overlook the 
effects of better integrated capital markets, larger FDI flows and the dynamic effects of 
integrated product markets, such as increased competition, and the effects on productivity 
through the exit of inefficient firms and innovation. Also, the transfer of ideas and technologies 
facilitated by international trade are not considered.
12 
 
The second category consists of studies using regression analysis to directly estimate the effects 
of EU membership on income growth. This does not confine the gains from membership to 
improvements in allocative efficiency, but considers the overall effect on production. Van 
Houdt (1998) uses panel data for 23 OECD countries and 5 time periods between 1970 and 
1990 to establish the effect of EU and EFTA membership on economic growth per capita. He 
derives that EU membership raises economic growth for a long time by about 0.6% to 0.8% per 
year. The results are not always robust to alternative specifications and with a similar data set 
Henrekson M. et al. (1997) and Van Houdt (1998) did not find a permanent growth effect of EU 
membership.  
 
11 See Lejour et al. (2006) for an overview. 
12 See for example Coe and Helpman (1995) and Griffith et al. (2000).   22 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002) conclude that the duration of EU membership has a positive 
effect on GDP growth per capita. Crafts and Kaiser (2004) stress the importance of the rule of 
law for the CEE countries and their economic performance. They conclude that economic 
growth per capita in the CEE countries can be about 4% in the medium term, if they move to 
EU standards of good governance. 
 
Eichengreen and Boltho (2008) question the validity of the quantitative results presented above, 
mainly because the benchmark, the counterfactual situation in which there is no internal market, 
is not well designed. The Del Gatto et al. (2006) paper is a clear example of this. Their 
benchmark is the absence of intra-EU trade. With this benchmark the benefits of IM are clearly 
overstated. Badinger (2005) considers all trade integration for the European countries, including 
global integration, in his estimations, but the outcomes can not be solely interpreted as IM 
effects. He concludes that global market integration increased income in Europe by about 20 
percent. 
Badinger (2005), Eichengreen and Boltho (2008) warn that the development of the IM is not 
an exogenous event. From a political economy point of view this decision is motivated. Even if 
the underlying reasons would not have culminated in an IM policy, other decisions would have 
been taken (probably also supporting trade within the EU). Examples could be a free trade 
agreement of the Mediterranean countries, an internal market for the Benelux countries etc. It is 
not hard to come up with alternatives for IM but which one is the right benchmark? 
Eichengreen and Boltho (2008) survey several key events related to European economic 
integration and investigate for each event the economic impact using existing quantitative 
estimates. They examine the European Payment Union, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the Common market (market integration until 1980), the 1992 Single Market 
Programme, and European Monetary Union (EMU) and try to be as sceptical as possible on the 
benefits of European integration. They conclude that only the Common Market and Single 
Market programme had a sizable effect on trade and GDP, and that it is too early to draw 
definitive conclusions on the EMU. Mainly based on the estimations of Owen (1983) for the 
Common Market and the European Commission (2002) for the Single Market, Eichengreen and 
Boltho (2008) conclude that economic integration within Europe has increased incomes by 
about 5%. Given their perspective this number has to be considered as a lower estimate. 
The quantification of this income effect is based on expert opinions, which are hard to 
reproduce. In this paper we consider a quantitative method that can be reproduced. We are 
careful in designing a benchmark which does not overstate the effect of economic integration. 
We want to identify the effects of economic integration in Europe on top of the overall trend of 
increasing trade openness since the 1960s and increasing foreign direct investment since the 
1980s. Our benchmark is increased openness for trade and FDI in the world. Therefore we 
include many non-EU countries in our data set which could serve as a good benchmark.   23 
3  Trade in goods 
3.1  Introduction 
Has the Internal Market reduced trade cost for its members? Since 1958, the EU has adopted 
various policies with the intention of reducing the cost of trade between member states. Apart 
from lowering tariff barriers these policies also comprise harmonisation of regulation in areas 
related more to domestic policy. The approach of this study is not to investigate the effects of 
each individual policy measure, but to estimate the overall effect of the Internal Market on trade 
and GDP. 
We estimate the effect of IM-membership on trade separately from the effect of trade on 
GDP. Similar to Frankel and Rose (2002), we first estimate a gravity equation in order to isolate 
the effect on trade and then perform a growth regression to determine the impact of trade-
openness on GDP. Regarding the gravity equation our analysis differs in three respects. First, 
whereas Frankel and Rose focussed on the effect of the Euro, we consider the effect of EU-
membership. Second, we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) by taking into account 
trade diversion. Third, we trace the effect of EU-membership over time, taking general 
globalisation trends as a “baseline”. 
Tinbergen (1962) already used a gravity equation to study the effect of free trade 
agreements (fta’s) on trade. He concluded that fta’s had an economically insignificant effect, 
while some later studies produced different outcomes. Abrams (1980), Aitken (1973) and Brada 
and Mendez (1985), for example, found an economically significant positive impact of fta’s. 
However, their conclusions are not supported by Bergstrand (1985), Frankel et al. (1995) and 
Frankel (1997). According to Baier and Bergstrand (2007b) these mixed results stem from a 
failure to account for the endogeneity of fta’s: countries that trade intensively are also likely to 
form fta’s. Without correcting for fta-endogeneity, they report that fta’s boost trade by just 14 
percent. After correcting for endogeneity, they find that an fta almost doubles the trade between 
members. 
Closely related to this literature are studies focussing on the EU as an fta. Frankel (1997) 
notes that the effect of EU-membership fluctuates over time and that pooling data from 1970 to 
1992 yields an EU effect of 16 percent. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) find effects of the EU12 
ranging between 34 and 60 percent depending on sample and year. In a recent study, Lejour et 
al. (2006) conclude that, controlling for various country characteristics, trade between two EU-
members is 34 percent higher than trade between non-members. The baseline gravity equation 
of Baldwin and Rieder (2007) implicitly yields an EU-effect of 51 percent.
13 
The introduction of the Euro also received much attention. After Frankel and Rose (2002) 
claimed that common currencies triple trade between members, a number of studies followed. 
 
13 Chen (2006) and Nitsch (2000) compared intra-EU trade flows with intra-national trade instead. Both authors found that 
national borders in the EU still have a large impact on trade.   24 
Rose and Stanley (2005) provide a meta-analysis of these studies. More recent papers are due to 
Baldwin (2006), Barro and Tenreyro (2007), and Serlenga and Shin (2007). Bun and Klaassen 
(2007) argue that panel estimates of the Euro-effect are generally too large because they fail to 
account for trends in bilateral trade. They show that little Euro effect remains after allowing for 
pair wise trends. 
This chapter proceeds with estimating by how much and when the IM has affected trade in 
goods. After the theoretical framework is introduced in Section 3.2, estimation results are 
presented in Section 3.3. Next, the impact of the Internal Market on European and Dutch trade 
flows is analysed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. The latter two sections take into account 
both trade creation and trade diversion. 
3.2  Theoretical framework 
A simple way of testing the hypothesis that membership of the EU leads to lower cost for trade 
with other members, is to compare the trade between EU-members with trade flows for which 
at least one of the trading partners is not a member of the EU. 
There are two reasons why such a straightforward approach can lead to false conclusions 
about the effect of the IM on trade. First, the precision of such an approach hinges on the proper 
inclusion of control variables. The second has to do with trade diversion: the creation of the IM 
is likely to have influenced trade outside the IM as well. We will return to trade diversion later 
on and continue with a discussion on control variables. 
Besides EU membership, there are other factors determining the intensity of trade between 
two countries. Naturally, countries are likely to trade more when their economies are larger, or 
when the distance between the two countries is smaller. Similarly, other factors such as a 
common language and a common border may influence the level of trade between two 
countries. 
If not all factors influencing trade can be controlled for, the estimate of the IM-effect can be 
biased. For two reasons, this bias is likely to persist even when controlling for size of the 
economies, distance, common borders, language, colonial relationships, etc.  
First, trade between two countries depends not only on the characteristics of those two 
countries, but also on the characteristics of other countries (Anderson (1979)). Australia and 
New Zealand, for example, will trade more with each other than can be judged from the 
distance between the two nations. The geographic isolation of New Zealand with regard to the 
large economies elsewhere in the world, enhances the attractiveness of Australia as a trading 
partner.  
Second, countries do not join free trade agreements (fta’s) randomly. Instead, the decision to 
form an fta depends on factors like geographical proximity and cultural similarities. Some of 
these factors can be approximately controlled for using easily accessible data, but Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007b) argue that this is not the whole story. For an fta to make sense there need to   25 
be policy-related barriers to trade - otherwise signing an fta would be a purely ceremonial 
affair. For this reason, trade between fta-members is not necessarily larger than trade between 
countries that do not need to form an fta because the latter may already have few policy-related 
trade barriers. Comparing the trade between fta-members with other trade flows thus leads to 
underestimation of the benefits of the fta, unless all policy-related trade barriers are adequately 
controlled for. 
It is possible to avoid problems caused by unobserved control variables by means of panel 
data estimation techniques. Baier and Bergstrand (2007b) show that bias due to omitted time-
invariant controls can be prevented by adding fixed effects for each pair of trade partners. 
Drawback of this approach is that all time-invariant factors are lumped together, such that the 
effect of, say, distance on trade can no longer be isolated.
14 
 
The second problem why comparing trade between IM-members with other trade flows leads to 
a biased estimate of the effect of the IM has to do with trade diversion. When two countries 
establish an fta this will not only intensify the trade between them, but will also change other 
flows. By making trade with non-members less attractive fta’s not only lead to trade creation, 
but also cause trade to be diverted from non-members towards members. Going one step 
further, the consequences of an fta extend even to trade between non-members as trade between 
a member and a non-member is partly substituted by trade between non-members. 
Measuring the extent to which the IM has lowered trade costs is complicated because the 
consequences of the IM are not limited to its members. If, after controlling for other factors, 
trade flows between members are larger than other trade flows, this indicates a positive IM-
effect. However, the average difference between intra-IM trade and other flows is not a correct 
estimate of the amount of trade created by the IM. This would only be correct if all trade flows 
outside of the IM would not have been affected by the IM. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have devised a method for estimating the effect of the 
border between the United States and Canada on trade between US states and Canadian 
provinces. Building on the framework of Anderson (1979) and others, they derive trade flows 
for the counterfactual situation in which the border between the United States and Canada 
would not induce trade costs of any kind. As the method proposed by Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (A-vW) can be used for all types of (variable) trade cost, it can also be applied to the 
IM. 
The framework of A-vW rests on two main assumptions. The first is that a country’s 
production is fixed for a given year. A country’s total export quantity can therefore only change 
 
14 The relation between time-invariant variables and trade may itself have changed over time (Leamer (2007)). For example, 
Evans and Harrigan (2005) show that even though transport costs have declined, the opportunity cost of transportation time 
have become higher. However, Disdier and Head (2008) find evidence that the impact of distance on trade hardly changed 
in the second half of the last century. In view of this evidence, we conclude that pair wise fixed effects to control for distance 
and other time-invariant factors is reasonable.   26 
if the consumption of domestically produced goods moves in the opposite direction. The effect 
of trade on a country’s level of production is estimated in Chapter 6. 
The second main assumption is that each country produces a single type of final good, 
which is unique to that country. The purpose of this assumption is that exports from one country 
are imperfect substitutes for the exports from another country. 
Let  ij c  be the consumption of goods from country i in country j. A-vW assume that 
consumers in country j maximize utility u as defined by a CES utility function 
( )( )
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subject to the budget constraint 
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The parameter  i b  allows for differences in preferences and the quality of goods across 
countries, s  is the elasticity of substitution between goods,  i y  is a country’s nominal income, 
and  ij p  is the price of goods produced in i for consumers in j. 
The price of a good is different for consumers in different countries because of trade costs. 
If  i p  is the domestic price of goods produced in i, then  ij p  is the domestic price multiplied by 
a trade cost factor  ij t . 
ij i ij p p t =   (3.3) 
Assuming  ji ij t t = , A-vW show that this framework leads to a ‘gravity equation’ explaining 
bilateral trade from the size of the trading economies relative to the size of the world economy 
( W y ), the trade cost factor specific to the pair of countries, and two multilateral resistance 
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The larger the multilateral resistance terms are, the less attractive it is for countries i and j to 
trade  with  third  countries.  High  multilateral  resistance  terms  relative  to  the  costs  of  trade 
between i and j therefore imply more trade between these two countries. 
Each multilateral resistance term is a non-linear function of the multilateral resistance terms 
of the other countries, their share of the world economy and the trade cost factors:   27 
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If the IM has reduced the cost of trade between members of the EU, then - controlling for other 
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1   (3.6) 
Here,  ijt EU  is a dummy variable that equals one if both country i and country j are members of 
the EU at time t and zero otherwise.  1 - b  is the tariff equivalent for trade flows that (partly) 
fall outside of the IM and  ij e  captures the effects of all time invariant factors influencing the 
trade cost for the pair ij. 
 
We use the last three equations to estimate the effect of the IM on trade. The analysis proceeds 
in two steps. In the first step, the parameter b is estimated and in the second step, trade flows are 
computed for the counterfactual situation that the IM would not have existed.  
There exist four methods for estimating b in a way consistent with theory. The simplest 
method is to estimate the gravity equation with the multilateral resistance terms replaced by 
dummies for each country-year combination. This “dummy method” yields unbiased estimates, 
but is not the most efficient approach. 
The other three methods involve solving the non-linear system of resistance terms. A-vW 
use non-linear programming to get a solution for the system. Baier and Bergstrand (2007a) 
proceed by taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the system and substitute the resulting linear 
approximations of the resistance terms into the gravity equation. They labelled their method 
Bonus Vetus (“good old”) OLS because it avoids the non-linear programming used by A-vW 
and allows for estimation with standard econometric procedures. Last, Straathof (2008) shows 
that the system of resistance terms actually is log-linear. Solving the log-linear system yields 
expressions for the resistance terms that can be used in the gravity equation (which can 
subsequently be estimated with OLS).  
3.3  Estimation results 
To estimate the effect of the IM on trade, we use panel data on bilateral trade for 38 countries 
and subcontinents starting in 1961 and ending in 2005.
15 The use of panel data has two 
advantages. First, it allows us to follow the IM-effect over time. Second, using fixed-effects for 
 
15 Before 1990, observations were missing for some countries. A description of the data can be found in Appendix 1.   28 
each pair of trading partners reduces bias due to the endogeneity of IM-membership by taking 
into account time-invariant omitted variables.
16 
The empirical equivalent of the gravity equation using the dummy method is given by 
( ) ( ) ijt ij jt jt it it ijt jt it ijt D d D d EU a y y a a x f h + + + + - + + + = 1 ln ln ln 2 1 0   (3.7) 
In the expression above  ( ) b a ln 1 2 s - =  captures the effect of EU membership. The D’s are 
dummies for each country-year combination and have parameters d (in the expression above 
dummies equal to zero have been omitted). These dummies ensure that the estimated 
parameters are not biased because of multilateral resistance. In addition, the dummies absorb 
variation caused by  W y  that is not absorbed by the constant  0 a . 
The unobserved time-invariant characteristics of trade between i and j is captured by the pair 
wise fixed effects  ij h , which is a transformation of  ij e .
17 
3.3.1  Average effect of the Internal Market 
Equation (3.7) can be estimated using least squares with pair wise fixed effects. However, the 
residuals  ijt f  are likely to be heteroskedastic, clustered and autocorrelated. By estimating the 
covariance matrix as suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) it is possible to avoid biased and 
inconsistent standard errors for the coefficients. Because adding dummies for each combination 
of country and year in addition to the pair wise fixed effects leads to a large loss in the degrees 
of freedom and is computationally taxing, country dummies have been constructed on a bi-
annual basis. 
Estimation results for the average effect of EU membership are presented in Table 3.1. The 
first model regresses the log of trade on “GDP”, which is the log of the exporter’s GDP plus the 
log of the importer’s GDP. Pair wise fixed effects and bi-annual country dummies are included, 
but are not reported. Because of bi-annual country dummies it does not make much sense to 
include the GDP for the importer and the GDP for the exporter separately. 
Column (2) refers to equation (3.7) exactly. Besides GDP a dummy is included which 
equals one if both countries are a member of the EU and zero otherwise. The coefficient for the 
EU dummy of 0.31 reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of EU membership on 
trade between members of the EU.
18  
 
16 The use of pair wise fixed effects has the disadvantage that it filters out the consequences of IM policies effectuated 
before 1961 on the original six members of the EU. 
17 The derivation of the relation between  ij e  and  ij h  can be found in Linders and Straathof (2008). 
18 The conventional interpretation, that is without taking into account trade diversion, would be that the IM raised intra-EU 
trade by (exp(0.31) - 1) * 100% = 36%. This number is in line with the literature discussed on page 23.   29 
Table 3.1  Average IM-effect: Regression of log bilateral trade on bilateral EU membership 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)
a
    (5)   
                     
GDP  0.53  ***  0.52  ***  0.52  ***  0.52  ***  0.52  *** 
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
                     
EU      0.31  ***          0.32  *** 
      (0.04)            (0.04)   
                     
EU (excl. NL)          0.30  ***  0.30  ***     
          (0.04)    (0.04)       
                     
NL          0.40  ***  0.39  ***     
          (0.03)    (0.03)       
                     
EFTA                  0.14   
                  (0.09)   
                     
CEEC                  0.01   
                  (0.06)   
                     
EURO                  - 0.02   
                  (0.04)   
                     
N  51586    51586    51586    51586    51586   
# parameters  793    794    795    795    797   
R
2-adj.  0.82    0.82    0.82    0.82    0.82   
  a 
Data corrected for Dutch re-exports and re-imports. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% **1% and ***0.1%. 
Country-pair fixed effects and bi-annual country dummies included, but not reported. 
 
Model (3) has two EU dummies: one for all trade flows for which the Netherlands is either the 
importer or the exporter (NL), and one EU dummy capturing all other intra-IM trade (EU 
excluding NL). The sum of both dummies reproduces the dummy of model (1), such that EU 
excl. NL + NL = EU. The EU coefficient for the Netherlands is 0.40, which is higher than the 
average.
19 Model (4) is identical to (3) but uses data that have been corrected for re-exports and 
re-imports by the Netherlands. The corrected data do not yield very different coefficients. 
Model (5) adds various other indicators to the basic specification: a dummy on EFTA 
membership, a dummy for all trade between Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) 
and non-CEEC countries that occurred before 1990, and a Euro dummy.
20  
Inclusion of these dummies hardly changes the coefficient for EU membership. The 
coefficient on EFTA has the expected sign, but is not statistically significant. In regression 
results not reported here, the EFTA dummy has been split up for different cohorts. Also these 
dummies were not significant. This outcome is somewhat unexpected as EFTA countries can be 
considered to be participants in the IM - at least partly. The story of the EFTA, however, is 
different than that of the EU as the EFTA has lost members to the EU on several occasions. 
EFTA members for which the potential gains of EU membership are large are likely to have left 
 
19 The corresponding “conventional” IM-effect on trade between the Netherlands and other EU members would be 48%. 
20 1999 has been taken as the starting year of the Euro.   30 
EFTA earlier than countries for which these gains are smaller. This selection process could 
have had a downward effect on the EFTA dummy. 
The CEEC dummy is approximately zero,




Including a single dummy for EU captures the effect of IM averaged over time and countries. In 
the next two subsections we will loosen both restrictions. Below, we will first allow the EU 
effect to vary over time. After that, we turn to the effects of new member states entering the IM. 
3.3.2  The effect of the Internal Market over time 
IM policies, as well as global trading conditions, have changed over time. Therefore, the trade 
cost advantage of the IM relative to the rest of the world might also have changed. The relative 
depth of the IM can be estimated by replacing the EU dummy of the previous empirical models 
with a flexible time trend (or “linear spline”) which allows a change in slope at several fixed 
points in time. Table 3.2 contains the estimates for such an EU spline. We have divided the 
period 1961-2005 into six intervals. A separate coefficient is estimated for each interval, 
indicating the slope for that period. Note that a negative slope does not necessarily mean that 
the IM-effect is negative, but only that the IM-effect is declining. Intervals are chosen after 
visual inspection of results from rolling pooled regressions (this is explained in Appendix 2). 
Model (1) reveals that the impact of the IM has varied substantially over the years. The 
largest coefficient is found for the early stages of the IM, indicating a positive slope of the EU 
trend. The lowering of tariffs between the six founding members of the EU seems to have 
stimulated trade between them markedly. The advantage of EU membership suffered a backlash 
in the first beginning of the 1970s, as the slope of the EU trend is strongly negative for the 
period between 1970 and 1972. (We will see in the next section that this steep decline did not 
last long enough to let the IM effect become negative.) 
Between 1973 and 1983, the Internal Market got back on track with a slope of 0.84. 
Between 1984 and 1991 the effect of the IM remained roughly constant as coefficients are small 
and not significantly different from zero. The lead of the IM over the rest of the world declined 
after 1992, first slowly, later more rapidly. A possible explanation for this finding is the 
increase in globalisation, which makes intra-EU market regulation less exceptional. In 
 
21 In regressions without bi-annual country dummies, the CEEC dummy has a large negative coefficient. The effect of the 
Iron Curtain on trade appears to be captured by the country dummies. 
22 The absence of a Euro effect is in line with the findings of Bun and Klaassen (2007), who show that after allowing for pair 
wise trends, the adoption of the Euro only has a small impact on trade. They do not explicitly control for the IM.   31 
particular, global agreements made under the Uruguay Round of the GATT
23 came into force 
on January first 1995.
24 This has led to a world-wide reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  
Table 3.2  The IM-effect over time: Regression of log bilateral trade on EU spline 
    (1)    (2)    (3)
a 
  
               
GDP    0.52  ***  0.52  ***  0.52  *** 
    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
               
EU  1961-1969  2.24  ***  2.05  ***  2.05  *** 
    (0.23)    (0.26)    (0.25)   
               
  1970-1972  - 4.18  ***  - 3.87  ***  - 3.88  *** 
    (0.98)    (0.97)    (0.98)   
               
  1973-1983  0.84  **  0.86  **  0.86  ** 
    (0.29)    (0.26)    (0.28)   
               
  1984-1991  0.17    0.14    0.14   
    (0.23)    (0.24)    (0.21)   
               
  1992-1997  - 0.42    -0.30    - 0.30   
    (0.37)    (0.34)    (0.35)   
               
  1998-2005  - 0.96  ***  - 1.06  ***  - 1.06  *** 
    (0.27)    (0.26)    (0.27)   
               
NL  1961-1969      2.87  ***  2.76  *** 
        (0.22)    (0.21)   
               
  1970-1972      - 4.71  ***  - 4.54  *** 
        (1.14)    (1.11)   
               
  1973-1983      0.80  *  0.79  * 
        (0.96)    (0.33)   
               
  1984-1991      0.33    0.34   
        (0.37)    (0.35)   
               
  1992-1997      - 1.08    - 1.07  * 
        (0.58)    (0.53)   
               
  1998-2005      - 0.24    - 0.38   
        (0.33)    (0.35)   
               
N    51586    51586    51586   
# parameters    799    805    805   
R
2
-adj.    0.83    0.83    0.82   
  a 
Data corrected for Dutch re-exports and re-imports. 
Trends are normalized to have a minimum of zero and a maximum of one. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% **1% and ***0.1%. 
Country-pair fixed effects and bi-annual country dummies included, but not reported. 
 
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established 
at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995. 
24 Another explanation could be due to the Intrastat method for collection intra-EU data on trade (see Appendix 1). Including 
a dummy for Intrastat trade flows, however, did not change results.   32 
Models (2) and (3) in Table 3.2 decompose the EU spline into a spline for Dutch trade within 
the IM (“NL”) and a spline for other intra-IM trade (“EU”). Model (3) differs from model (2) in 
that it uses data corrected for re-exports and re-imports by the Netherlands. Models (2) and (3) 
are comparable to models (3) and (4) of Table 3.1, respectively. 
The impact of the Internal Market on the Netherlands has been more pronounced than its 
impact on the EU on average. The exception to this regularity is the period after 1998, where 
the reduction of the IM effect has been smaller for the Netherlands than for other member 
states. Correcting for Dutch re-exports and re-imports causes only slight changes in coefficients. 
3.3.3  Expansion of the Internal Market 
During the period 1961 to 2005 the EU has expanded five times.
25 The first expansion occurred 
in 1973 with the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The fifth expansion took 
place in 2004 and included ten countries from Central Europe. 
The consequences of entry can be identified by adding a dummy for each of the five cohorts 
of entering countries. Each dummy is equal to one for all trade flows that are new to the IM and 
zero otherwise. For example, the dummy EU7-9 equals zero for all trade flows before 1973 and 
one for all intra-IM trade where United Kingdom, Ireland or Denmark are either importer or 
exporter. Thus, after 1973 not only exports from Ireland to Denmark get a one, but also the 
imports by the United Kingdom from France. 
Table 3.3 displays the regression results with indicators for each cohort of entrants. In model 
(1) all coefficients have the expected sign and, except for the expansion to EU25, all 
coefficients are statistically significant. This means that almost every expansion of the EU has 
raised the level of intra-IM trade with the new members. The small coefficient (0.07) for the 
expansion to 25 members is not unexpected because it is based on data from only two years, 
2004 and 2005. Typically, it takes about five to ten years before a country is fully adjusted to 
the IM (Dekker et al. (2007), Ch. B3). 
The second and third model have cohort indicators specific to the Netherlands as well as 
cohort indicators capturing the rest of the intra-IM trade. The coefficients for the Netherlands 
are comparable with those for the EU on average, except that the entry of Greece has hardly had 
any influence on its trade with the Netherlands. Another difference is that Dutch trade with the 
EU16-25 countries has had a positive impulse from the fifth expansion - even though just two 
years of data are available during which these trade flows fall inside the IM. 
 
25 A brief history of the EU can be found in Chapter 2.   33 
Table 3.3  Expansion of the IM: Regression of log bilateral trade on EU cohort indicators 
    (1)    (2)    (3)
a 
  
               
GDP    0.52  ***  0.52  ***  0.52  *** 
    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
               
EU  EU7-9  0.55  ***  0.54  ***  0.54  *** 
    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)   
               
  EU10  0.18  ***  0.19  ***  0.19  *** 
    (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.03)   
               
  EU11-12  0.48  ***  0.47  ***  0.47  *** 
    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)   
               
  EU13-15  0.21  ***  0.20  ***  0.20  *** 
    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)   
               
  EU16-25  0.07    0.06    0.06   
    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)   
               
NL  EU7-9      0.61  ***  0.59  *** 
        (0.05)    (0.04)   
               
  EU10      0.10    0.09   
        (0.06)    (0.06)   
               
  EU11-12      0.53  ***  0.52  *** 
        (0.04)    (0.04)   
               
  EU13-15      0.31  ***  0.30  *** 
        (0.05)    (0.05)   
               
  EU16-25      0.14  **  0.11  * 
        (0.05)    (0.05)   
               
N    51586    51586    51586   
# parameters     798    803    803   
R
2
-adj.    0.83    0.83    0.82   
  a 
Data corrected for Dutch re-exports and re-imports. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% **1% and ***0.1%. 
Country-pair fixed effects and bi-annual country dummies included, but not reported. 
 
3.4  Europe with and without the Internal Market 
How would the exports and imports of EU members be affected if there would never have been 
a common market? Although the regression results presented above give an idea of the role 
played by the IM, additional analysis is required to make a distinction between trade created by 
the IM and trade diverted by it. We have used the framework developed by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) to compute the counterfactual trade flows that would have taken place if the 
IM would not have existed.
26 
 
26 To be precise, the method we have used for deriving counterfactual trade is a variant of Anderson and Van Wincoop’s 
method proposed by Straathof (2008). Another variant due to Baier and Bergstrand (2007a) is reported in Appendix 3.   34 
A first question which needs to be answered is whether the IM actually has created trade or 
whether it has merely diverted trade with non-members to trade within the IM. Figure 3.1 
shows how the openness of the EU15 has changed over time.
27 The figure is based on the spline 
estimated in model (1) of Table 3.1. The top line is the actual openness, while the second line 
refers to the counterfactual situation without the IM. The bottom line is the difference in 
openness with and without the IM (right hand axis). 
Without the IM, the openness of the EU15 would not have grown as fast as it has. Our 
method implies that at the beginning of our dataset the IM-effect is zero. Over the years the IM 
has contributed increasingly to openness, but in the last decade the difference has become 
smaller. 





































































































actual openness openness without IM difference (right axis)  
The first peak in the contribution of the IM occurred around 1970. In this year twelve percent of 
trade can be attributed to the IM.
28 A sharp drop immediately afterwards stabilised in 1974 at 
seven percent. A second increase occurs in the second half of the 1980s, while the last interval 
running from 1998 to 2005 is characterised by a decline in the IM effect. The second peak was 
reached in the early 1990s. At that time the IM was responsible for approximately 18 percent of 
trade. After 1995 the IM-effect started to decline gradually eventually arriving at eight percent 
in 2005. This pattern occurs with both exports and imports. 
 
 
27 Openness is defined here as the sum of a country’s total exports and imports of goods divided by value added in non-
service sectors. 
28 The percentages mentioned here are percentage points of actual exports or imports. The trends in Figure 3.1 refer to the 
sum of exports and imports relative to GDP.   35 
Another issue is how the IM has created trade: by reducing trade cost between existing 
members (deepening) or by giving more countries access to the IM (expansion). Although it is 
not possible to estimate both the consequences of deepening and expansion simultaneously,
29 
we use the estimates of Table 3.3 to calculate the counterfactual trade flows without expansion 
of the IM. Deepening can then be approximated by the difference of the overall effect and the 
expansion effect. 
The top panel of Table 3.4 displays the share of the EU15 exports that can be attributed to 
the IM. The first row reports that in 2005 eight percent of all exports by the EU15 were 
attributable to the IM. The second row shows that for the entire period from 1961 to 2005 the 
IM has on average been responsible for twelve percent. The other rows refer to sub-intervals. 
The bottom panel of the table displays the outcomes for imports. The first column containing 
the total effect shows a sharp increase in the IM-effect in the early stages.  
The second and third column contain the effects for deepening and expansion of the IM, 
respectively. Here, “deepening” is defined as the difference between the total effect and the 
expansion effect. The impact of EU expansion proved to be more durable than the impact of 
deepening. This makes that for exports in 2005 expansion has been responsible for the entire 
effect of the IM.
30 Deepening has been a substantial factor in the second half of the 1980s, but 
its contribution has weakened in the years thereafter.
31 For imports expansion has been equally 
influential. 
The last three columns consider three important expansions in isolation. Just as it is possible 
to study what would have happened without the IM, it is also possible to compute 
counterfactual trade flows assuming that only a specific expansion would not have occurred, 
while the other expansions remain unaltered. The first column shows that the expansion to nine 
members is responsible for four percent of EU15 trade in 2005. The accession of Spain and 
Portugal has had an effect of three percent; the expansion to fifteen member states contributed 
one percent. 
 
29 In principle, a spline can be included in the regression for each cohort of trade flows. The problem of this approach is that 
the coefficients obtained in this way are strongly influenced by intra-EU trade diversion. The A-vW method, however requires 
that only variables are included that directly affect trade cost; the effects of trade diversion should be captured by the bi-
annual country dummies. 
30 The expansion effect might be overestimated in 2005, because coefficients for expansion are not allowed to vary over 
time. The resulting deepening effect might therefore be underestimated. 
31 It is possible that the coefficients capturing expansion also include some deepening effects.   36 
Table 3.4  Share of EU15 exports and imports due to the IM: effects of deepening and expansion 
Year  Total effect
a 
    Deepening
b 
     Expansion
c
 
          All cohorts  EU7-9  EU11-12  EU13-15 
Exports                 
2005  0.08    0.00    0.09  0.04  0.03  0.01 
                 
1961-2005  0.12    0.04    0.08  0.05  0.02  0.01 
                 
1961-1969  0.06    0.06           
1970-1972  0.09    0.09           
1973-1983  0.10    0.05    0.05  0.05     
1984-1991  0.14    0.07    0.07  0.05  0.02   
1992-1997  0.15    0.06    0.09  0.05  0.03  0.01 
1998-2005  0.11    0.02    0.09  0.05  0.03  0.01 
                 
Imports                 
2005  0.08    0.00    0.08  0.04  0.03  0.01 
                 
1961-2005  0.12    0.04    0.08  0.05  0.02  0.01 
                 
1961-1969  0.05    0.05           
1970-1972  0.09    0.09           
1973-1983  0.09    0.04    0.05  0.05     
1984-1991  0.14    0.07    0.07  0.05  0.02   
1992-1997  0.15    0.06    0.09  0.05  0.03  0.01 
1998-2005  0.11    0.02    0.09  0.05  0.03  0.01 
  a 
Total effect is based on the EU spline of model (1) in Table 3.2. 
b 
Deepening is approximated as the total effect minus the expansion effect for all cohorts jointly.
 
c 
The expansion effect is reported for all expansions since 1973 jointly (“All cohorts”); for expansion from EU6 to EU9 (“EU7-9”); for 
expansion from EU10 to EU12 (“EU11-12”); for expansion from EU12 to EU15 (“EU13-15”). The last three columns assume that all 
earlier and later expansions did take place. The expansion effects are based on model (1) in Table 3.3.
 
 
3.5  The Netherlands with and without the Internal Market 
How would the Dutch exports and imports be affected if there would never have been a 
common market? Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the openness of the Netherlands with and 
without the IM. The IM has had a substantial impact on the openness of the Netherlands, even 
when compared to the EU15 as a whole (Figure 3.1). 
Table 3.5 displays the share of Dutch exports and imports that is due to the IM. Three 
different sets of results are presented: total effect, deepening and expansion. The first, “total 
effect” corresponds to the effects of the IM over time (Table 3.2) and “expansion” to the 
consequences of new member states for the Netherlands (Table 3.3). Each set of results is 
shown with and without a correction for Dutch re-exports and re-imports.   37 





































































































actual openness openness without IM difference (right axis)  
Dutch exports seem to have benefited most from EU membership: about eighteen percent of the 
Dutch exports in 2005 can be attributed to the IM. The benefits for Dutch imports are smaller 
about twelve percent are due to the IM. These numbers vary according to whether data have 
been corrected for re-exports or not, but the difference between the minimum value and the 
maximum is not larger than two percentage points. 
Like the EU average also the Netherlands has experienced two peaks in the IM effect. The 
first peak occurred in 1970 with an IM contribution of 28 percent (average of imports and 
exports). The subsequent sharp decline ended in 1974 at 16 percent. The Netherlands reached 
its second peak of thirty percent already in 1991 - earlier than the EU on average. 
The Dutch trade has thus been affected more by the IM than the EU15 on average and this has 
been a result of deepening exclusively. The effect of deepening has been substantially larger for 
the Netherlands than the expansion effect, this in contrast to the EU15 for which expansion was 
more important than deepening. 
That the impact of the IM on the Netherlands has been larger than the EU average can also 
be seen from Figure 3.3 which compares the share of Dutch exports attributable to the IM with 
the share for the rest of the EU6. Over the entire period from 1961 to 2005 Dutch exports have 
been stimulated more than exports by the other founding members. The last decade of the series 
displays even a divergence in the IM-effects as the share of exports attributable to the IM 
started to grow again for the Netherlands. 
 
   38 
Table 3.5  Share of Dutch exports and imports due to the IM 
                    Total effect
a
                     Deepening                             Expansion
b
 
Exports             
Re-exports corrected  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
             
2005  0.17  0.18  0.10  0.11  0.07  0.08 
             
1961-2005  0.19  0.21  0.13  0.15  0.06  0.06 
             
1961-1969  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.00  0.00 
1970-1972  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.20  0.00  0.00 
1973-1983  0.19  0.19  0.14  0.15  0.05  0.05 
1984-1991  0.23  0.24  0.17  0.18  0.06  0.06 
1992-1997  0.21  0.23  0.16  0.17  0.06  0.06 
1998-2005  0.17  0.18  0.10  0.11  0.07  0.07 
             
Imports             
2005  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.09  0.03  0.03 
             
1961-2005  0.14  0.16  0.10  0.12  0.03  0.04 
             
1961-1969  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.00  0.00 
1970-1972  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.00  0.00 
1973-1983  0.13  0.14  0.10  0.11  0.03  0.03 
1984-1991  0.18  0.19  0.14  0.15  0.03  0.04 
1992-1997  0.16  0.18  0.12  0.14  0.04  0.04 
1998-2005  0.11  0.13  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.04 
 
a
 Refers to models (2) and (3) of Table 3.2. 
b
 Refers to models (2) and (3) of Table 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the IM’s contribution to imports of the Netherlands and the other EU6 
countries. Compared to exports, two things stand out. First, the Netherlands moves closely 
together with the rest of the EU6. Although the IM-effect is still larger for the Netherlands, the 
difference with the other countries is modest and does not increase over time. Second, the share 
of Dutch imports attributable to the IM does not seem to stabilise in the last decade, but 
continue to decline. 
The rise of trade with other EU countries hardly has led to trade diversion. Table 3.6 
displays how intra-IM and extra-IM exports would have changed for the Netherlands. The 
positive effect of the IM of intra-IM trade is substantially larger than the negative effect on 
extra-IM trade. Although trade diversion does occur, it is much smaller than the trade creation 
effect. 
An alternative scenario could be that the Netherlands would never have joined the IM and 
would also not have signed special trade agreements with the EU, like Norway and Switzerland 
did. In this scenario, the consequences for the Netherlands could have been more severe 
because other countries could have diverted their trade away from the Netherlands and towards 
other members of the EU. The difference in impact of the two scenarios, however, turns out to 
be small, both for exports and imports. Our results show that the total, re-exports corrected,   39 
effect of Dutch membership on exports is 0.19 in 2005, while the number for imports is 0.13.
32 
The estimates for deepening and expansion also do not vary substantially across scenarios. 
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32 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.   40 
Table 3.6  Trade creation and trade diversion: share of Dutch intra-IM and extra-IM trade due to IM
a 
Year                           Exports                           Imports 
  Intra-IM  Extra-IM  Intra-IM  Extra-IM 
         
2005  0.19  - 0.01  0.14  - 0.01 
         
1961-2005  0.22  - 0.01  0.17  - 0.02 
         
1961-1969  0.13  - 0.01  0.13  - 0.01 
1970-1972  0.21  - 0.01  0.19  - 0.02 
1973-1983  0.20  - 0.01  0.15  - 0.01 
1984-1991  0.25  - 0.01  0.21  - 0.02 
1992-1997  0.24  - 0.01  0.20  - 0.02 
1998-2005  0.19  - 0.01  0.15  - 0.02 
  a 
Based on estimates of the total expansion effect of model (3) in Table 3.3; data corrected for Dutch re-exports and re-imports; 
intra-IM and extra-IM add up to total effect (except for rounding errors) 
3.6  Conclusions 
The Internal Market appears to have stimulated trade between members substantially, while 
trade diversion has been small. The impact of the IM on the imports and exports of European 
countries has varied over time. The first stage of the IM was characterised by a rapid expansion 
of its effectiveness, culminating in a peak contribution to EU trade of about twelve percent of 
actual trade in 1970. The peak contribution for the Netherlands was 28 percent. After this first 
peak, the contribution of the IM to trade dropped sharply to seven percent in 1973 for the EU 
and 16 percent for the Netherlands. 
A second peak of was reached first half of the 1990s. At this time the share of trade 
attributable to the IM was about 18 percent for EU-members on average and about 30 percent 
for the Netherlands. The second peak occurred at the time the Single Market was formally 
completed. During the last decade of our data sample, the impact of the IM declined again to 8 
percent in 2005 for the EU and 18 percent for the Netherlands. In contrast with the EU average, 
the decline in the contribution of the IM seems to stabilise for the Netherlands. 
All expansions of the EU have had a positive impact on trade with new members. The accession 
of the Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom has had the most profound impact (five 
percent of EU15 trade), while the impact of the 2004 expansion has been small. This latter 
effect is not surprising as the EU25 only existed in the data sample for two years. Overall, 
expansion of the EU is estimated to be responsible for 9 percent of EU15 exports and imports. 
The contribution of all enlargements to Dutch exports is 7 percent. The effect on Dutch imports 
is smaller and amounts to 3 percent of imports in 2005.   41 
4  Trade in services 
4.1  Introduction 
Trade in services covers about 20% of total trade globally. This share is rather stable since the 
1980s. Only one tenth of world services output enters international trade, compared to over half 
of the production of goods (UNCTAD (2004)). In spite of the increasing importance of services 
in value added and employment in most industrialized countries, the share of services in total 
trade has not significantly increased. Trade in business services has increased, partly due to 
outsourcing, but the impact of total trade in services is mitigated by relatively less trade in 
transport services and travel.
33 
Our question is whether IM policies have contributed to intra-EU trade in services? Overall 
trade in services has not grown faster than trade in goods since the 1980s, but the growth rates 
of intra-EU trade in services and extra-EU trade in services could have developed differently 
due to IM policies.  
Before answering this question we have to define trade in services because the concept is 
much more complex than trade in goods. Trade in goods is considered to be cross-border trade. 
Firms could also deliver the foreign market by establishing a foreign affiliate, but this is not 
classified as international goods trade. For services this is different. Four modes of international 
transactions are distinguished. Mode 1 is cross-border trade (as in goods). Mode 2 represents 
foreign sales if the consumer moves to the country of the producer (for business travel or 
tourism). Mode 3 reflects foreign sales by producers which established an establishment in the 
country of the consumer. Mode 4 covers temporary international movements of independent 
service providers.
34 
In this chapter we concentrate on the impact of IM policies to stimulate the free movement 
of services on international services trade covering cross-border trade (mode 1) and tourism and 
travel (mode 2). These two categories together are classified as total trade in services of which 
tourism and travel forms on average about a quarter of the value of total services trade (Kox et 
al. (2004)). Mode 3 is more important for services trade than mode 1 and 2 and will be 
investigated in chapter 5. Data on foreign sales are highly inaccurate and incomplete; therefore 
FDI stocks are often used to represents foreign sales. The development of FDI stocks is closely 
related to the free movement of capital which the main focus in chapter 5. Thereby chapter 4 
and 5 together cover the broad concept of trade in services. 
In principle cross border trade in services could be treated empirically similarly as trade in 
goods. Theoretically it can be argued that trade in services is different because services differ 
from goods because of the intangibility of services and lack of standardization. This discussion 
 
33 See the annual reports of the WTO and Kox et al. (2004) among others.  
34 According to the meagre and rough statistics mode 4 covers only about 1% of the value of all international transactions in 
services and is neglected in this study.    42 
is neglected here.
35 We follow the same methodology as for trade in goods. The same 
theoretical framework (as in section 3.2) is applicable and the same empirical equivalent of the 
gravity equation (equation 3.7)).  
The main reasons not to explore the possible methodological differences in explaining 
cross-border trade in goods and services is the notoriously lack of data on bilateral trade in 
services. 1999 is the first year for which bilateral data on total trade in services are published by 
the OECD (2002). Since then researchers have started to analyse bilateral trade in total services 
using a gravity model and also have included dummies for regional free trade agreements 
(fta’s). This dummy does not only include the EU but also NAFTA and other fta’s. Kimura and 
Lee (2006) identify a positive effect of fta’s on bilateral trade in 1999 and 2000, but warn that 
Japan is the only country in the sample without fta’s. It is not clear whether this effect identifies 
relatively limited services trade to and from Japan or a positive impact of fta’s. For the same 
data set Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) also identify a positive effect of fta’s on services trade. For 
the 1999 data Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003) do not find a positive effect of fta’s on services 
trade. They suggest that most fta’s do not include services trade and that the lack of services 
trade is caused by national regulation. Walsh (2006) introduces a dummy for the internal market 
in the EU, but does also not find a significant result for the years 1999-2001 in his preferred 
estimation method. In some regressions he finds a significant positive effect. Ceglowski (2006) 
concludes that the EU has stimulated trade in services but suggests that this is induced by the 
complementarity with bilateral trade in goods. 
In the meantime, the data base on bilateral trade in services has expanded and covers the 
years 1999 to 2005. Therefore we are able to exploit some of the time variation in the data 
which previous studies could not do. In addition, it includes the enlargement of the EU in 2004.  
Because of the lack of data prevents us to replicate the complete analysis for trade in goods 
we first discuss the availability of trade in services data in section 4.2. Section 4.3 estimates the 
IM effect of trade in services using the same methodology as for trade in goods. Section 4.4 
presents the outcomes of IM policies on total trade in services for the EU15 and the 
Netherlands. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2  Trade data in services 
The analysis of trade in services is based on a database containing reports of service flows from 
OECD countries, Hong Kong and the Russian Federation to their trading partners from 1999 to 
2005. We use trade data on total services, because these data are most complete. There are two 
problems related to this data base. First, there are often two reporting OECD countries for the 
same trade flow because trade involves an exporter and an importer. Second, the database is not 
 
35 See for example the special issue on trade in services in the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (2008, 
forthcoming).   43 
complete. We miss data and the quality of some of the data is disappointing. Third, the number 
of observations is increasing over time. We discuss these issues below. 
First, double reporting of the OECD exporter and importer is a problem because the reported 
values for the same trade flow can deviate relatively much. We use a method that has been 
proposed by Gehlhar (1996) for merchandise trade and is followed by Leeuwen et al. (2007) for 
trade in services. The Gehlhar method uses reliability indices for each country.
36 When two 
values are reported for the same flow we use the value of the reporting country with the highest 
reliability index. 
Second, many data are missing. In principle the database contains export and import flows 
of service trade that occur between the reporting OECD countries and over 200 partner 
countries and regions. Bilateral trade data to and from most partner (non-OECD) countries are 
missing and the quality of the remaining data is poor. For this reason we only include bilateral 
trade data between reporting OECD countries. In addition, for six OECD countries
37 the data 
are relatively incomplete, therefore they have been excluded as well. 
This leaves us with 26 countries (24 OECD, Hong Kong, Russian Federation). There are 
potentially 650 (n(n - 1)) annual observations. This is however not the case, but the data 
availability is increasing over time (in particular until 2002). The smallest number of positive 
observations is 523 in 1999 and the largest number is 650 in 2004. The first years of the sample 
miss reported bilateral data for Belgium and Luxembourg. As a consequence, we have only 156 
bilateral flows between EU15 countries instead of 210 per year. This is a serious reduction of 
data points to identify an IM effect. For this reason we include these available data points for 
later years in our sample and construct thereby an unbalanced sample. We perform sensitivity 
analyses with balanced samples. 
The amount of (reported) trade in services between the countries in the sample has increased 
730 billion dollars in 1999 to 1230 billion dollars in 2005. This implies an average annual 
increase of about 9%. Intra EU15 trade accounted for 290 billion dollars in 1999 and for 530 
billion dollars in 2005. Trade in services thus nearly doubles between 1999 and 2005 for EU 15 
measured in US dollars, as can be seen in Figure 4.1 by the EU line rising from 100 
(normalisation) in 1999 to 185 in 2005. The steep rise in services trade of the EU15 with and 
between the EU16-25 countries in 2004 and 2005 compared to intra-EU15 trade is due to the 
EU-accession of these ten countries. Trade with and between these countries increased from 20 
billion dollars in 1999 to 52 billion in 2005. Services trade of other OECD countries and 
between EU and non-EU countries accounted for 420 billion dollars in 1999 and for 650 billion 
dollars in 2005: a 50% increase. This suggests that services trade between EU members has 
 
36 A value is considered reliable when it deviates less than some fraction (20%) from the value reported by the partner 
country. The sum of the reliable flows is then divided by the sum of the reported flows in order to determine the reliability 
index of the country. This index always lies between 0 and 1. When calculating the reliability indices, flows that are not 
reported by the partner country are considered unreliable. 
37 Korea, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey.   44 
developed faster than between other countries in this period. This result could be biased due to 
better reporting over time but Kox et al. (2004) conclude that intra-EU services trade has grown 
faster than EU- extra services trade for the period 1985 to 2001. 
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4.3  Method 
4.3.1  Model specification 
For estimating the effect of the IM on services trade, we use panel data on bilateral trade for 26 
countries starting in 1999 and ending in 2005 as described above. The use of panel data allows 
us to follow the IM-effect over (a limited period of) time and the using fixed-effects for each 
pair of trading partners reduces bias due to the endogeneity of IM-membership by taking into 
account time-invariant omitted variables.
38 The empirical equivalent of the gravity equation (see 
equation 3.7) is given by 
( ) ( ) ijt ij jt jt it it ijt jt it ijt D d D d EU a y y a a x f h + + + + - + + + = 1 ln ln ln 2 1 0   (4.1) 
( ) b a ln 1 2 s - =  captures the IM effect. The D’s are dummies for each country-year 
combination and have parameters d. These dummies ensure that the estimated parameters are 
not biased because of multilateral resistance. In addition, the dummies absorb variation caused 
by  W y  that is not absorbed by the constant  0 a . The unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
of trade between i and j are captured by the pair-wise fixed effects  ij h , which is a 
 
38 The use of pair-wise fixed effects has the disadvantage that it filters out the consequences of IM policies effectuated 
before 1999.   45 
transformation of  ij e . The covariance matrix is estimated it is possible to avoid biased and 
inconsistent standard errors for the coefficients as suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
Adding dummies for each combination of country and year in addition to the pair-wise fixed 
effects leads to a large loss in the degrees of freedom and is computationally taxing. Therefore, 
country dummies have been constructed on a bi-annual basis. 
In addition, we also estimate the model using a dummy for EU_NL and for EU_other. This 
allows us to estimate different effects for the EU15 as a whole and for the Netherlands. The 
EU_NL dummy is 1 when both trading countries are a member of the EU and one of the 
countries is the Netherlands, and 0 otherwise. The EU_other dummy is 1 when both trading 
partners are in the EU and the Netherlands is not involved, and 0 otherwise. The sum of these 
two dummies is always equal to the regular EU dummy.  
4.3.2  Estimation results  
The results for the fixed effect estimator are shown in Table 4.1 for three samples. In all 
samples there as two regressions: one with a total EU dummy and one with a separate EU 
dummy for the Netherlands and a remaining EU dummy. In all regressions the coefficients on 
GDP are significantly lower than 1 which is usually the case in cross-section analysis. The 
reason is that we included by-annual country dummies in the regression which identify also 
large share of the GDP effect on bilateral trade. For the 1999-2005 (column (1) to (2)) the EU 
dummy is positively significant. This is also the case for the Dutch EU dummy. In a non- 
reported regression for a balanced sample between 1999 and 2005 the EU dummy is not 
positive any longer. The reason is that we have excluded the bilateral data for Belgium and 
Luxembourg in later years which are in particular relevant to identify an IM effect as discussed 
in section 4.2. For this reason we do not trust the results of the balanced sample from 1999 
onwards. 
Because since 2002 data are nearly complete, 2002 to 2005 is our preferred sample (column 
(5) and (6)). The regression results for the balanced and non-reported unbalanced sample are 
nearly identical. Services trade between EU countries has increased by about 11% (=e
0.11 – 1) 
during the sample period due to IM. For the Netherlands the IM effect on intra EU services 
trade is positive, but not statistically significant. The reason is that the number of observations 
for bilateral service trade relations with the Netherlands is too limited to identify a separate IM 
effect. The standards errors are quite high compared to the balanced sample between 2001 and 
2005 (column (3) and (4)) which indicates to limited data to identify efficiently an IM effect. 
Because this is a statistical outcome not pointing to the negligibility of an IM effect, we assume 
for the Netherlands the same effects as for the EU15 as a whole (results column (5)). In the next 
section we will calculate the effect on total trade for the EU15 and for the Netherlands. 
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Table 4.1  Regression results for fixed effect panel estimator for IM 
Sample period  Unbalanced, 1999-2005              Balanced, 2001-2005              Balanced, 2002-2005 
Column  1  2  3  4  5  6 




i GDP GDP )  0.36
***  0.36
***  0.37***  0.37***  0.37***  0.36*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
t
ij EU   0.09
*** 
  0.10***    0.11***   
  (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.03)   
t
ij NL EU _     0.20
**    0.19**    0.07 





***    0.10***    0.11*** 
    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.03) 
             
Observations  4201  4201  2820  2820  2524  2524 
Within R
2  0.51  0.51  0.48  0.48  0.47  0.47 
 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *10% **5% ***1%; country dummies 
included for 26 countries and 7 years, but not reported. Dependent variable is bilateral services trade estimated with fixed effect panel 
estimator. 
a EU dummy is without the Netherlands. What is specified as t
ij other EU _  below equation (4.1). 
 
4.3.3  Alternative specification 
Because the time series is rather short we also present cross section estimates. We specify the 
following equation:  
   
  (4.1) 
 
t
ij x  represents the service trade flow between country i and j in US dollars and  t
j
t
i GDP GDP  the 
product of importer and exporter GDP in US dollars.  t
ij nce dista  is measured in kilometres. The 
other variables represent dummies:  t
ij contig  is 1 if countries share a border (otherwise 0), 
t
ij comlang  is 1 if countries share a language,  t
ij colony  is one if the country has been a colony of 
the other in the past, t
ij EU is 1 if both countries are a EU15 member, and  x c is 1 if the importer or 
exporter is a specific country in a specific year. The latter dummies
39 are included to solve 
problems with omitted variables. There could also be omitted bilateral variables that correlate 
with included variables. It is not possible to solve this by adding country-pair dummies because 
that would make it impossible to identify the EU15 effect. 
4.3.4  Estimation results  
We present the regression results with OLS for each year. A disadvantage of the OLS estimator 
is that it can not include zero trade flows because the logarithm of zero is undefined. As a 
consequence all observations with a zero trade flow are ignored. However, the observations are 
 
39 A dummy is included for the exporting country as well as for the importing country. The amount of country-year specific 
dummies is equal to 2ny, where n is the number of countries and y is the number of years. This approach allows for 
differences in country-specific trade costs of exporting and importing. 
m a b b
b b b b b
+ + + +





























4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(  47 
missing because of no reporting and do not reflect zero trade flows between the (OECD) 
countries involved.
40  
The results in Table 4.2 show that the GDP and distance variables are always statistically 
significant at the 1% level and have values consistent with those in the literature. The 
coefficients for contiguity and colony are significant and positive. The coefficient for a common 
language is always positive, but only significant for 2001. The variable for the EU dummy is 
only significant in 2002, at a 5% confidence level. Its coefficient varies between - 0.02 (2000) 
and 0.34 (2002) with a mean of 0.13. This is comparable to the outcome of the panel estimation, 
but the standard error is much larger. The coefficient for the EU dummy is not very stable over 
time. Non-reported regressions with the same number of observations over the years show a 
similar pattern of the EU dummy over time. This lack of stability is not caused by changes in 
the data coverage over time. 
Table 4.2  OLS cross-section regression results between 1999 and 2005 for IM 
   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 












  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
ln( t
ij nce dista )  - 0.91
***  - 0.92
***  - 0.87
***  - 0.89
***  - 0.83
***  - 0.84
***  - 0.88
*** 
  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
t








  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.20) 
t




  0.11  0.04  0.11 
  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
t








  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
t
ij EU   0.13
  - 0.02
  0.16
  0.34
**  0.21  0.11
  0.01
 
  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
               
Observations  523  535  571  635  640  650  647 
R
2
-adjusted  0.86  0.86  0.85  0.85  0.86  0.84  0.82 
               
Robust standard errors between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *10% **5% ***1%; country dummies included for 
26 countries, but not reported. Dependent variable is bilateral services trade. 
 
4.4  The EU15 and the Netherlands with and without the Internal Market 
The IM effect on total services trade is expected to be smaller than indicated by the results 
above because these estimations do not take account of trade diversion. As discussed in chapter 
3 we apply the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to correct for this omission. We use 
 
40 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest using the Poisson estimator to get consistent results, because OLS is likely to 
be inconsistent in estimations of gravity equations due to heteroskedasticity. However, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) show 
that the heteroskedasticity assumed by PPML is not always present in international trade data and that OLS outperforms 
PPML in out-of-sample forecast.   48 
GDP as a proxy for intra-national trade in services.
41 Based on the transformed EU15 variable 
and the coefficients for the EU15, it is possible to estimate the IM effect on each bilateral trade 
flow for each year. We use the estimates reported in Table 4.1. Because we have used a sample 
of about 30 countries we miss about 30% of total services trade in the bilateral data.
42 Also the 
size of these trade flows will be corrected in estimating the net amount of services trade for the 
Netherlands and the EU due to the internal market. 
The final effects of EU on the services exports and imports of the EU15 are presented in 
Table 4.3.
43 This table shows the share of trade that can be attributed to the EU. The first (third) 
column in the table shows the effect of the EU on the exports (imports) of the EU15 using the 
traditional approach in which trade diversion is ignored. The effects vary slightly by year 
because the share of the services are traded with EU countries varies over time. Without trade 
diversion, the average increase of total exports and imports between 1999 and 2005 is about 
5.3%. This is about half of the increase in bilateral EU15 trade (11%), reflecting that about 50% 
to EU15 services exports is destined for non EU15 countries. 
Table 4.3  EU15 services trade due to the Internal Market as share of total services trade 








         
                                 in %     
         
1999  5.1  4.8  5.1  4.8 
2000  4.8  4.5  4.8  4.5 
2001  5.0  4.7  5.1  4.7 
2002  5.4  5.1  5.7  5.3 
2003  5.4  5.0  5.7  5.3 
2004  5.5  5.1  6.0  5.5 
2005  5.2  4.8  5.7  5.3 
Average  5.2  4.9  5.4  5.1 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The traditional approach overestimates the effect on total services exports mildly. The 
difference is only 0.3% points with the traditional model because most of the trade substitution 
occurs with domestic trade according to our estimations. 
 
The results for the Netherlands are calculated using the same EU coefficient (0.11) This is why 
the IM effects for the Netherlands (see Table 4.4) are about 0.5% points higher than for the 
EU15. This difference reflects the higher intra-EU services trade intensity of Dutch trade. The 
 
41 Service activities form the major part of GDP. However, trade is usually a lot higher than value added due to the fact that 
services are sold at production value to which not necessarily much value added is created. Therefore GDP is a reasonable 
proxy for the amount of trade in services. 
42 These numbers can be derived from the total services exports and imports of the reporting country without knowing the 
bilateral flows.   
43 Due to data limitations it is not possible to determine the trade effect for the EU25.    49 
average effect of the IM of total services trade is about 5.5% for the Netherlands with the AvW 
model. Also for the Netherlands the trade diversion effects is not very large (comparing the 
“traditional” and “AvW” columns), but compared to the EU15 slightly more important. 
Between 2000 and 2001 Table 4.4 shows an increase in the IM-effect. This is caused by a 
substantial shift in the Dutch trade pattern from external EU trade to intra-EU trade in services 
in these years. After 2002 this shift is partly reversed and the IM-effect as share of total services 
trade decreases. 
Table 4.4  Dutch services trade due to the Internal Market as share of total services trade 








         
                                 in %     
         
1999  5.0  4.6  5.2  4.8 
2000  5.2  4.7  5.1  4.7 
2001  6.6  6.1  6.5  6.0 
2002  6.7  6.1  6.6  6.0 
2003  5.8  5.3  6.1  5.6 
2004  5.9  5.4  6.3  5.8 
2005  5.6  5.0  6.2  5.7 
Average  5.8  5.3  6.0  5.5 
         
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4.5  Conclusions 
Intra EU-services trade seems to have increased slightly faster than services trade between other 
OECD countries. The internal market could be an explanation for this. Our empirical research 
suggests that the EU countries traded 11% more with each other than with other countries 
between 1999 and 2005. Of the total amount of EU15 services trade about 5% can be explained 
by the internal market in services. For the Dutch trade in services the IM effect is slightly 
larger. These effects are calculated while taking trade diversion into account but the model 
suggests that the effects of trade diversion on total trade are limited. Most of the increase of 
intra-EU trade in services did not come at the expense of trade with other countries. If this 
pattern is persistent the recently adopted Services Directive (European Commission (2006)) will 
also create net trade (Kox and Lejour (2006); De Bruijn et al. (2008)).  
The estimated effect is identified using data from 1999 due to data limitations. This implies 
that we can not measure the effect of the EU before that time. It could be that IM also had a 
positive effect on services trade in the years before 1999, although policy efforts towards IM 
were always much more focussed on trade in goods than on trade in services, take for example 
the Single Market Programme. From that perspective it is reasonable that the net trade increase 
in services is much smaller than for goods.   50 
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5  Foreign Direct Investment 
5.1  Theory and literature 
5.1.1  Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are investments with the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy in an entity resident in another economy (OECD 
(1996). FDI has grown particularly fast, at a much higher rate than trade transactions since the 
1980s: FDI flows have increased by about 25% per year on average and trade flows by about 
10% on average per year (Markusen (2002) ,UNCTAD (2004)).  
The rise of FDI is global. Our interest is the role of the Internal Market for the development 
of FDI. Did IM policies aimed to ease the free movement of capital contribute to intensified 
foreign direct investment within Europe? We use gravity equations to explain the development 
of FDI and estimate the contribution of IM to FDI in Europe. 
The rise of FDI attracted also the attention of researchers to the behaviour of multinational 
enterprises (MNE). One methodology is partial equilibrium analyses to determine the effect of 
exogenous macroeconomic factors (such as exchange rate movements, taxes and tariffs) on FDI 
decisions of firms. This literature is primarily focussed on short-run effects and ignores long-
run general-equilibrium factors that influence FDI decisions (Blonigen (2004) ). This is clearly 
a problem when cross-section data are used. 
A gravity model with time series on FDI could solve this problem. The gravity model has 
worked particularly well in empirical studies on trade (see chapters 3 and 4) as well as on FDI. 
Several researchers have tried to underpin the gravity model for FDI with a theoretical model. 
Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) suggested that FDI can be motivated by trade barriers 
and by access to low wages. The former form is called horizontal FDI and the latter is called 
vertical FDI. More recently, authors have suggested other forms of FDI, like export platform 
FDI (Ekholm et al. (2003); Bergstrand and Egger (2004)). This type of FDI is used to serve the 
neighbouring markets of the host country.  
Because there are multiple types of FDI with different motives and due to the complexity of 
the theoretical models it is difficult to translate these models into an empirical specification. 
Brainard (1997) derives an equation that shows that the share of total foreign sales that are 
exported depends negatively on export frictions like transport costs and tariffs. Based on US 
data she found evidence for this relationship. Markusen et al. (1996) developed the knowledge-
capital model, which is more complex than that of Brainard (1993), Brainard (1997) and has 
more flexible assumptions. The implications of the model were that FDI is influenced by the 
traditional gravity variables like market size and trade frictions, as well as by factor 
endowments.  
Carr et al. (2001) empirically tested the hypotheses of the knowledge-capital model for the 
US. In their empirical specification the amount of affiliate sales depended on the GDP of both   52 
countries, the trade costs, the FDI costs, and differences in factor endowments labelled as skill 
differences. They found evidence for horizontal motivated FDI as well as for vertical motivated 
FDI. However, the evidence for vertical motivated FDI was criticised because of the 
specification of the skill differences variable Blonigen et al. (2003).  
The two-country models implicitly assume that FDI decisions between two countries are 
independent on FDI decisions between the parent country and any other host countries. For 
export platform motivated FDI this is a particularly bad assumption. Firms that are considering 
FDI in order to serve a specific region will generally choose to invest in the most attractive 
country in that region. This could imply that countries nearby an attractive host country for FDI 
will attract a relatively low amount of FDI. Blonigen et al. (2004) indeed find that the amount 
of FDI received by European countries is negatively affected by the amount of FDI received by 
their neighbours and positively by the GDP of their neighbours. Coughlin and Segev (2000) 
find an opposite result for China: the amount of FDI received by Chinese provinces increases 
with the FDI received by their neighbouring provinces. They explain this by the existence of 
agglomeration externalities. 
This literature predicts that FDI is affected by three main factors: market size, trade costs 
and factor endowments. Although there is no unambiguous model that leads to the functional 
form of the gravity specification, many empirical studies have successfully used the gravity 
model to estimate FDI flows, using various variables for market size, trade costs and factor 
endowments.  
5.1.2  The gravity model for FDI and the effect of the EU 
Various studies have focussed on the effect of European economic integration on FDI using a 
gravity model. Brenton et al. (1999) use a specification where the stock of FDI is explained by 
the GDP and population size of the host country, the distance between both countries and 
dummy variables for preferential relationships between both countries. The expected sign of the 
EU dummy is ambiguous. If the investing country is also a member of the EU, FDI can increase 
due to the liberalisation of the financial flows and the reduced transaction costs. FDI can also 
decrease, because trade costs are reduced as well, which decreases the need for horizontal FDI. 
When the investing country is not a member of the EU the effect is also ambiguous. On the one 
hand, Neary (2002) concludes that the economic integration of Europe could lead to ‘fortress 
Europe’ for outside countries, reducing FDI inflows. On the other hand, firms might find it 
more attractive to invest in Europe because it offers free access to the whole EU. 
Brenton et al. (1999) perform separate regressions for each investing country. For most 
investing countries they find that the EU coefficient is insignificant. They do warn that this 
result might be caused by a correlation of the EU dummy variable with other explanatory 
variables.  
Panel data techniques are a solution for the problems that occur when the EU dummy 
correlates with other explanatory variables. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) use this technique to   53 
explain the stock of FDI by the real GDP per capita and the population size of both the 
investing as the receiving country. They include bilateral dummies to account for all observed 
and unobserved time-invariant bilateral effects like distance and common language and time 
dummies to account for cycle effects that are the same for all countries. Finally, they include a 
variable that measures the integration phase effects. They distinguish between three integration 
phases: the period 1986 - 1992, the period 1993 - 1994 and the period starting in 1995 and 
conclude that the effect of additional economic integration seems to occur in the years before 
the event. For example, they conclude that the effect of the Single Market Programme (SMP) 
has already materialised between 1987 and 1992. The effect of the enlargement in 1995 can be 
found in the period between 1993 and 1995. At that time the amount of FDI between the three 
new members and the EU12 increased 26% faster than that of intra EU12 FDI.  
Since this study focuses on the effects of the internal market on FDI and not in the other 
determinants of FDI we use the same method as Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004): a fixed effect 
estimator to compensate for all bilateral time-invariant effects. Bi-annual country dummies are 
able to capture country-specific trend effects, see also the empirical analysis of goods trade in 
chapter 3. 
5.2  Estimation results 
To estimate the effect of IM on FDI we use panel data on bilateral FDI stocks. The main reason 
for using FDI stocks instead of FDI flows is that the former are a better proxy for the sales 
activities of foreign affiliates as a measure of the capital stock than FDI flows. Ideally one 
would try to explain activities of foreign affiliates by statistics of their sales but these are hardly 
available, except for a few countries like the US.  
Our database contains bilateral FDI stocks between 30 reporting OECD countries and over 
300 partner countries and regions from 1981 until 2005. The non-OECD partner countries have 
been removed from the database because many data any missing. In principle there are 870 (n(n 
- 1)) observations for each year, but the data are not complete for all country-pairs. This is often 
the case in the first years of the time period. When a country did not report a bilateral FDI stock 
we will use the reported value by the partner country. When both countries reported a value we 
will use the value reported by the host country, because these values are considered to be more 
reliable.  
The empirical gravity equation is given by 
( ) ( ) ijt ij jt jt it it ijt jt it ijt D d D d EU a y y a a FDI f h + + + + + + + = 2 1 0 ln ln ln   (5.1) 
In the expression above  2 a  captures the effect of EU membership, but is not related to an 
elasticity of substitution as is the case for goods and cross-border services trade. The reason is 
that equation (5.1) is not directly derived from a theoretical model. The D’s are dummies for   54 
each country-year combination and have parameters d (in the expression above dummies equal 
to zero have been omitted). These dummies ensure that the estimated parameters are not biased 
because of multilateral resistance. The unobserved time-invariant characteristics of trade 
between i and j is captured by the pair wise fixed effects  ij h , which is a transformation of  ij e . 
An time-varying EU dummy is included to determine if the EU enlargements have led to 
higher FDI stocks between EU-members.
44 In an alternative specification a second dummy 
(toEU) is included to determine the effect of the EU on inwards FDI stocks of countries that are 
no EU member. This dummy is 1 if the investing country is not a member and the host country 
an EU member. A third dummy (fromEU) is included to determine the EU-effect on FDI stocks 
of EU-members in other countries. This dummy returns 1 if the investing country is an EU-
member and the host country not. The time period covers the 1986, 1995 and 2004 enlargement 
of the EU. Due to the bad data coverage we can not identify separate accession effects as is 
done in chapter 3.  
 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the fixed effects estimator for two specifications and for two 
(unbalanced) samples. First we discuss the results for the most extended sample between 1981 
and 2005. In the first column the FDI stocks between EU members are compared to all other 
FDI stocks. The coefficient for the EU dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In the second column, the variables EU, toEU and fromEU show the difference of FDI 
stocks compared to the case in which both countries are no member of the EU. At the 1% 
confidence level, FDI stocks between two EU-members are significantly higher compared to 
FDI stocks between countries that are both not a member of the EU. This is also the case for the 
FDI stocks of other countries in the EU (toEU). The EU dummy has a higher coefficient (0.25) 
than the toEU dummy (0.13). This is consistent with our expectations. The creation of the IM 
makes EU countries more attractive for FDI, because products that are produced in the EU can 
be transported relatively cheap to all other EU countries due to reduced trade restrictions. This 
argument applies for the EU dummy and the toEU dummy.  
These results indicate that bilateral FDI stocks between EU members is on average 28% 
(=e
0.25 - 1) higher than FDI stocks between two countries that are both not a member of the EU. 
For bilateral FDI stocks of other countries in EU countries this percentage is 14%. 
The sample is highly unbalanced. In particular in the 1980s many OECD countries did not 
report bilateral FDI stocks. We present the estimation results for an other sample 1994 and 2004 
for which the data coverage is much better. The results are similar as for the extended sample 
except for the higher EU coefficient in the first regression. In this sample the EU coefficients in 
 
44 In this sample, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Denmark and Greece are EU 
member from 1981 (beginning sample). Spain and Portugal enter in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, and Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic in 2004.    55 
both samples are of the same magnitude. The lack of data between 1981 and 1993 does not 
seem to affect the regression coefficients substantially.
45  
Table 5.1  Regression results of fixed effects estimator for IM effect on bilateral FDI stocks 
Period                            1981-2005                             1994 - 2004 









  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
t





  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
t
ij toEU     0.13
***    0.11
** 
    (0.04)    (0.05) 
t
ij fromEU     - 0.00    - 0.06 
    (0.04)    (0.09) 
Observations  10933  10933  6713  6713 
Within R
2
  0.65  0.65  0.44  0.44 
         
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *10% **5% ***1%; country-pair fixed effects 
and bi-annual country dummies for 30 countries and 25 years (11 years) included, but not reported. The dependent variable is the 
bilateral FDI stock.  
 
5.3  The EU15 and the Netherlands with and without the Internal Market 
Using the outcomes in Table 5.1 for the extended sample period, this section determines the 
bilateral FDI stocks in the counterfactual case without an Internal Market. This means, for 
example, that the FDI stock of Germany in the Netherlands is 28% higher with IM than without 
IM and the FDI stock of the US in the Netherlands is 14% higher with IM. Applying this to all 
bilateral FDI stocks yields the graphs in Figure 5.1. We are not able to correct for possible 
substitution from FDI stocks to others countries and from (domestic) capital stocks in the own 
country resulting from IM as we did for goods and services trade. These trade diversion effects 
can only be estimated in the framework of AvW for goods and services. For FDI we miss such 
a concise theoretical framework. 
 
45 Ideally we would present the results for a balanced sample. This would reduce the number of observations with a third for 
the sample 1994 - 2004 and the efficiency of the estimations. Then the EU coefficient is still positive but standard errors are 
substantially larger.   56 
Figure 5.1  Total outward (left panel) and inward (right panel) FDI stocks of the Netherlands with and without 











































with IM without IM  
Figure 5.1 shows the share of the Dutch outward (left panel) and inward (right panel) FDI 
stocks that can be attributed to IM. For the Netherlands, the IM share for outward FDI is on 
average 9% of the outward FDI stock and the share for inward FDI is on average 16.5% of the 
inward FDI stock. The main reason for this difference is the impact of IM on inward FDI stocks 
from non-EU countries. The EU became more attractive to invest in for countries outside the 
EU because of access to the Internal Market.  
Figure 5.2  Share of outward and inward FDI stocks for the Netherlands (left panel) and the EU15 (right 















































outward inward  
The right panel of Figure 5.2 shows the share of FDI for the EU15 that can be explained by the 
IM over time. For the EU15 the share of the outward and inward FDI due to the EU is on 
average about 8.5% and 16%, respectively. These shares are slightly lower than for the 
Netherlands, but the difference is small. For the EU15 the IM effect seems to decline in 2004 
and 2005. This is not the case for the Netherlands which is caused by a lower share of FDI with 
EU countries in the total FDI stock. The IM effect for the EU15 also declined somewhat 
temporarily between 1997 and 1998.  
The increases in FDI stocks attributable to IM in Figure 5.2 between 1994 and 1995 is 
caused by the expansion of the internal market of the EU with Austria, Finland and Sweden in 
1995. Because of this expansion, a larger part of the outward and inward FDI of the Netherlands 
could be attributed to the EU. The sudden increase in Dutch outward FDI stocks in 1999 seems   57 
to be specific for the Netherlands. The expansion of the EU in 2004 can not be identified for the 
EU15 in the graph, although we still see a small increase in the IM effect on the Dutch outward 
and inward FDI stock. Anticipating EU-membership, many European multinationals have 
already invested in the new Member States since the 1990s, which could be an explanation for 
the rather stable shares from the mid 1990s onwards. 
5.4  Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests a significant effect of the Internal Market on FDI stocks. FDI stocks 
between EU members have accumulated 28% faster than FDI stocks between two countries 
outside the EU. This increase in FDI stocks between EU countries can be explained by a higher 
level of economic integration and lower transaction costs within the EU. Inward FDI stocks to 
EU countries from non-EU OECD countries are 14% higher compared to FDI stocks between 
two OECD countries outside the EU.  
For the Netherlands, the share of the total amount of inward (outward) FDI stocks that can 
be explained by the IM is 18.5% (15%) in 2005. For the EU15 as a whole the shares of inward 
and outward FDI stocks due to the IM are slightly lower. The reason is that the share of the FDI 
stocks from other and to EU countries is larger for the Netherlands than for the EU15 as a 
whole. The effects presented above do not take account of possible substitution effects with 
other investments and could therefore be upward biased.   58 
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6  Trade and growth 
6.1  Introduction 
A higher openness to international trade may increase productivity and economic growth 
through various channels. First, higher openness expands the scale of the market, leading to 
more foreign competition and access to a greater variety of products. Second, the increase in 
scale induces specialization and innovation because new opportunities arise. Third, openness 
may lead to spillovers of technological and organisational knowledge.
46 
In this chapter, we investigate how the increase in goods and services trade resulting from 
the internal market (IM) has affected the economic growth of the EU and of the Netherlands. 
The income effects of the IM via FDI will be briefly addressed in Chapter 7. 
6.2  Empirical growth model 
Our empirical analysis of the growth effects of EU membership follows a large empirical 
literature on the determinants of economic growth (e.g., Barro (1991); Mankiw et al. (1992); 
Islam (1995a)). In this literature per capita GDP in country i at time t ( it y ) is regressed on 
initial GDP per capita  t - t i y ,  (with t  spanning some pre-defined period of time), the country’s 
investment rate I/Y, rate of population growth n, and a number of variables related to total factor 
productivity.
47 Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) provide robustness analyses 
of the explanatory variables used in this empirical growth regression approach. 
For our purposes we approximate total factor productivity by openness to international 
trade, primary education, and secondary education.
48 The growth regression equation that we 
specify to relate per capita income levels in year t to its determinants, including openness to 
trade, is as follows: 
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The main variable of interest is  t - t i O , , the initial trade-openness defined as total export plus 
total import as a ratio to GDP (cf., e.g., Frankel and Romer (1999); Frankel and Rose (2002)). 
 
46 See Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991), Rivera Batiz and Romer (1994), Romer (1994), Coe and Helpman (1995). 
47 We follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995b)), who derive the growth regression equation from the neoclassical 
Solow growth model. For this purpose, the relevant variable to reflect replacement investments per capita contains not only 
the population growth rate, but also the rate of exogenous technological progress (g) and the rate of depreciation of capital 
(δ). Following the literature, we assume that technological progress and depreciation are equal across countries and set the 
sum of both equal to 0.05. As a result, the variable (ni+gi+δi) becomes (ni+0.05). 
48 The empirical relationship between openness and growth has been investigated in a large number of papers, such as 
Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel and Rose (2002) and Alcalá and Ciccone 
(2004).   60 
In line with, e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995b) and Bond et al. (2001), we include 
human capital proxies as a further determinant of productivity. We use attainment levels for 
primary (predu) and secondary (sedu) education (in percentages of population aged over 15). 
To capture any direct effects of EU membership on income levels (which run through channels 
other than trade openness), we include a dummy variable for EU membership. Period-specific 
effects are included as well. Appendix 5 more elaborately discusses the derivation of the growth 
regression equation from the neo-classical growth model framework. 
Given the problems related to the potential endogeneity of initial per capita income and 
openness (see Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Islam (1995b)), we adopt a panel data model 
specification. The problems of endogeneity arise from potential omitted variable bias in the 
growth regression equation. The initial level of total factor productivity may differ across 
countries. Although we include openness to international trade and education variables to 
capture these differences, many more factors will be of influence on total factor productivity 
differences, most of which are not easily measurable. Most notable, persistent differences in 
initial technological knowledge are subsumed in the random error component in the regression 
model. Most likely, these country-specific effects will not be randomly distributed and may be 
correlated to some of the explanatory variables in the model, such as openness to trade and 
investment rates. This would cause endogeneity bias, because the error component is correlated 
to the regression variables. A second source of endogeneity bias is the potential reverse 
causation between openness to trade and income levels. Although we use initial openness to 
explain subsequent income levels, the time lag may be insufficient to solve potential 
simultaneity bias. A third source of endogeneity bias is that initial total factor productivity is a 
determinant of initial income per capita. This leads to correlation between a regression variable 
(viz., initial income) and the error term in the model. Panel data estimators are better suited to 
control for such sources of endogeneity bias (Islam (1995b); Bond et al. (2001)). 
We have divided the total time span of T years into periods of each 5 years ( 5 = t ), which 
form the panel observations for each country. Due to limitations to data availability, we choose 
to divide the period between 1960-2004 into 8 periods of 5 years and a final period of 4 years. 
Since we include the five-year lag of income per capita as a regression variable, the model is a 
dynamic panel data model. 
All variables, except openness and the EU membership variable, are expressed in terms of 
natural logarithms, as is common in the literature. Openness is expressed as a perunage. The EU 
membership variable equals 0 for non-member countries, 1 if a country was member for a 
whole panel period of 5 years, and 0.2, for example, if it was member for only 1 out of 5 years 
in a given period. The investment rate and the augmented population growth rate are averages 
for each 5-year period. Openness and human capital levels are start-of-period values, as is initial   61 
income per capita.
49 The database used for growth regression covers the period 1960-2004. We 
use the Penn World Table 6.2 for data on income per capita, investment rates, population 
growth, and openness. All variables are expressed in constant international prices (PPP 
adjusted). Human capital data are from Cohen and Soto (2007). 
6.3  Estimation results 
We are interested in the effect of changes in openness over time on the level of per capita 
income. In particular, we are interested in the income effect of changes in openness resulting 
from IM. Next, we proceed to estimate the growth regression model to derive estimates for the 
effect of changes in openness on per capita income levels over time. These parameter estimates 
are necessary to assess how changes in openness caused by IM affect income levels for the 
Netherlands and the EU as a whole. Table 6.1 presents the regression results for the per capita 
income equation specified in equation (6.1). 
The first specification presents the results for a pooled OLS estimation. The results show 
that initial income, the investment rate, population growth and openness all statistically 
significantly affect per capita income. In the growth regression literature, a benchmark measure 
often used to compare the outcomes of different specifications is the rate of convergence 
implied by the estimation results. The growth regression equation used here is based on the neo-
classical Solow growth model. The convergence rate indicates how fast the economy moves to 
the long-run growth path, the so-called steady state, on which per capita income growth is fully 
determined by the rate of technological progress, which is assumed to be exogenous to the 
model (see, e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995a)). The implied rate of convergence (λ) 
of 1.2% in the first specification is comparable to findings derived elsewhere in the literature 
(see, e.g., Islam (1995a); Bond et al. (2001)). In a meta-analysis of the convergence rates 
reported in the growth regression literature, Abreu et al. (2005) report that around one third of 
the convergence rates reported are within the range of 1%-3%. This range also contains the 
mode of the estimates reported. Since OLS is likely to lead to biased results due to omitted 
variables bias, pooled OLS is not our preferred method of estimation. In fact, the coefficient on 
initial income in OLS regression is likely to be biased upward (Bond et al. (2001)). 
 
49 A typical panel observation would be, e.g., the period 1960-1965. The dependent is log income per capita in 1965. Initial 
income is per capita income for 1960 ,and likewise for openness and human capital. The EU membership variable and 
investment rate are averages over 1960-1964. The averages do not include 1965 for two reasons. First, 1965 would already 
be included to compute the average for the subsequent panel observation (i.e., the period 1965-1970). Second, it seems 
most natural to consider investment over 1960-1964 to determine capital stocks in 1965. In this way, moreover, averages 
are indeed actually computed over 5 years instead of 6 years. The augmented population growth rate is the average growth 
of population levels between 1960 and 1965, augmented with the term 0.05 as explained before.   62 
Table 6.1  Growth regressions for a panel of five-year span data
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Pooled OLS  Within groups  System GMM  GMM: balanced 
panel 
         
Log initial income per capita  0.94***  0.80***  0.95***  0.93*** 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Log investment rate  0.09***  0.05**  0.13***  0.19*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Log augmented pop. growth rate  – 0.22***  – 0.08  – 0.15  – 0.16 
  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
Log primary school attainment  0.00  0.01  0.04**  0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Log secondary school attainment  0.02*  0.01  –0.00  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Initial openness  0.05***  0.09***  0.09***  0.03 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
EU membership indicator  0.00  0.03  0.00  –0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Constant  – 0.20  1.39***  – 0.18  – 0.15 
  (0.15)  (0.28)  (0.52)  (0.31) 
Implied rate of convergence (λ)  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01 
Observations  601  601  601  344 
Number of countries  81  81  81  43 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99       
F-statistic  5162.46  195.97  1626.07  3478.00 
within R-squared    0.84     
AR(2) p-value      0.71  0.68 
Hansen p-value      0.82  0.78 
         
Dependent variable: log end-of-period real gdp/capita (constant prices, PPP adjusted). Robust standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; period dummies not reported. 
a The final period covers 4 years: 2000-2004. 
 
Panel estimation using the “within groups” estimator has been suggested as a solution for bias 
related to omitted country-specific effects. This method subtracts country-specific means over 
time from each variable, cancelling out the country-specific effects. The estimator thus exploits 
only variation in the time dimension to estimate the parameters. The results for this estimator 
show that most key variables, including openness, are qualitatively robust. The parameter on 
initial income, however, shows a marked quantitative change. It is much smaller, which results 
in a higher speed of convergence. In fact, the “within” estimator has been shown still to suffer 
from endogeneity bias in finite samples for dynamic panel data models. For a small T (as in our 
application), the transformation results in a negative correlation between initial income and the 
error term. This leads to downward bias in the parameter estimate (see Roodman (2006)).  
To overcome the problems with OLS and within-groups estimation Bond et al. (2001) 
suggest to use the system-GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator extends the difference GMM estimator associated 
with, e.g., Arellano and Bond (1991). Difference GMM expresses the dynamic panel data   63 
model in first differences, cancelling out the country-specific effects. The endogeneity in the 
differenced model is subsequently addressed by using suitably lagged levels of the regressor 
variables as instrumental variables. As shown by Bond et al. (2001), though, difference GMM 
is very sensitive to weak-instruments bias. Especially for persistent series, such as GDP per 
capita,
50 lagged levels may not provide good instruments for subsequent first-differences. Bond 
et al. (2001) argue that system GMM provides a solution, by estimating two equations: a first-
differenced equation, using lagged levels as instruments, and a levels equation that uses suitably 
lagged first-differences as instruments. This estimator is able to provide consistent estimates 
even in finite samples, where the number of periods is small. Using lags to enforce exogenous 
instruments, the estimation does not suffer from bias due to omitted country-specific effects. 
Moreover, potentially endogenous regressors (such as openness) can also be effectively 
instrumented by lagged levels and lagged first differences. Hence, the endogeneity bias is 
explicitly addressed by system GMM. 
The last two columns of Table 6.1 present the results of system GMM.
51 The first GMM 
estimation shows a high parameter on initial income and a positive and significant effect of 
initial openness on income over a 5-year period. The second estimation is acquired from a 
balanced panel, in which all countries are included each period. Although the results for the 
balanced sample show a general loss of efficiency (reflected by an increase in standard errors 
and a loss of statistical significance, e.g. for openness), the results appear qualitatively robust. 
Most parameters are within one standard deviation from the estimates in the larger panel. 
Statistical tests on autocorrelation in the levels equation, and on the validity of the instruments 
(Hansen test) give reassurance on the model specification. As in Bond et al. (2001), system-
GMM estimation substantially increases the parameter estimate on initial income compared to 
within-groups estimation, and yields a convergence rate that returns within the 1%-3% range. A 
point of concern is that the estimated parameter on initial income is about equal to the OLS 
estimate. Given the expected upward bias of OLS, this is somewhat surprising. As a result, the 
implied rate of convergence of 1% is at the lower bound of the modal interval reported in Abreu 
et al. (2005). We will therefore be cautious when applying the growth regression estimates in 
the calculation of the income effect of IM-induced changes in openness. In these calculations, 
we will report a low and a high effect scenario. In the high scenario, we will use the regression 
results from our preferred GMM estimation (specification 3), which theoretically best addresses 
 
50 As  1 b  is close to one, the possibility arises that the GDP series has a unit root. Papell and Prodan (2004), Papell and 
Prodan (2007) show that GDP does not have a unit root once structural breaks are taken into account. 
51 System GMM regressions have been performed using the ‘xtabond2’ command developed by Roodman (2006) for Stata. 
We have used two-step system GMM, with robust standard errors (Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction). The instruments 
included in the first-differences equation of system GMM are: income per capita (lagged 2 to 4 periods), investment rate, 
population growth rate, primary school attainment, secondary school attainment, initial openness, and EU membership 
variable (all lagged two periods). For the levels equation, first-differences of the regressors, lagged two periods, have been 
used as additional instruments. The period dummies and the constant term have been included as standard instrumental 
variables (the latter only for the differences equation). The ‘collapse’ option has been used to reduce the number of 
instruments. The main criterion we have used to check validity of the instruments, and hence of the specification choice, was 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Also, a test for autocorrelation in levels has been performed.   64 
the endogeneity bias in finite-sample dynamic panel data models. In the low scenario, we will 
use the results from the within-groups estimation. Theory argues that this specification may 
suffer from a downward bias in the initial income parameter, which – as we will see – reduces 
the long-run effects of the IM on income per capita. The parameter on openness, measuring the 
direct 5-year impact of changes in openness on per capita income, is robust across both 
specifications used in our computations below. 
6.4  The income effects of the Internal Market 
We separately address the income effect of changes in openness resulting from increased trade 
in goods and from increased trade in services that are related to the IM for the Netherlands and 
the EU. Based on the parameters from the growth regression, we can derive an estimate for the 
effect of deepening and extension of the Internal Market since 1960 on the current level of per 
capita income (represented by 2005 income levels: the first year following our period of 
analysis). The effect of changes in openness that can be attributed to IM on per capita income 
levels can be computed as follows.
52 The total derivative of per capita income levels in the end-
year T with respect to changes in openness in each period can be computed as follows from the 
parameter estimates in the growth-regression equation: 
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Equation (6.2) reflects two effects of changes in openness related to the IM on per capita 
income levels. First, a change in openness at the beginning of a period raises income levels 5 
years later, at the end of the period. This effect is captured in the growth regression by the 
parameter for openness (γ). Second, an increase in income per capita transfers to future income 
levels over time. This effect (captured by the parameter on initial income, β1) is less than 
proportional, though, reflecting decreasing returns to reproducible production factors (physical 
and human capital) and convergence to a new steady state. Table 6.2 shows the estimated effect 
of IM integration over the past 4 to 5 decades on income levels for the Netherlands and the EU 
as a whole. 
The effect of the IM on per capita income in 2005 from equation (6.2) can be seen as the 
cumulative effect of past integration steps. This effect arises during the transition to a new long-
run steady state, which will be characterized by permanently higher income per capita levels. 
Given the convergence rate that we derive from the specifications used for the income effect 
 
52 None of the estimated models show a significant direct effect of EU membership on income levels. Regressions that 
excluded openness, but included the EU membership variable also did not yield a substantial, nor statistically significant, 
positive effect. Therefore, we believe that the effect of the IM on income is best proxied as a trade-induced effect captured 
by the changes in openness due to the IM. Therefore, we do not consider growth effects captured by the estimated 
parameter for the EU membership variable in the table below.   65 
calculations, which ranges from 1.2%-4.5%, about half the distance to the long-run steady state 
would be crossed in 16 to 70 years. This implies that the major part of the income effect of the 
IM may not have been realized yet. Moreover, given that the effect of the IM on openness 
changes over time, it is an interesting question what the long-run effect of the IM on per capita 
income will be. Hence, we also derive an estimate for the ultimate long-run income effect of the 
current state of IM integration.  
The long-run, steady state effect of a change in openness can be derived from the growth 
equation (6.1). The long-run income effect is computed by multiplication of the change in 
openness with the long-run parameter of openness. The log-run parameter is the semi-elasticity 
of income with respect to openness (cf. Frankel and Rose (2002)). We refer to Appendix 5 for 
the derivations. This leads to the following expression for the long-run income effect of a 
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We will use this formula to derive an estimate of the long-run (i.e., steady-state) income effect 
of the IM for the Netherlands and the EU as a whole, again for the low and high scenarios with 
respect to the growth regression specification. We separately address the income effect of 
changes in openness resulting from increased trade in goods and from increased trade in 
services that are related to the IM. The long-run effects are presented in Table 6.2. Before we 
present these long-run estimates, we first need to answer the question what would be a plausible 
scenario for the persistent, long-run effect of the IM on openness to international trade? 
The long-run effect of the IM relies on the assumption that the effect on openness that is 
attributable to the IM persists over time. Ultimately, the IM would not have a separate effect if 
the counterfactual world without an EU-IM would succeed to reduce trade costs by exactly the 
same amount between EU countries by multilateral agreements. Our results on goods trade have 
indicated that the IM effect on openness continues to exist so far, although it has generally 
decreased over time. This may indicate that extension and deepening of the IM competes with 
multilateral declines in trade costs. How would this extend into the future? 
We could assume that the IM will be extended in the future, by accession of new EU 
member states, and will be further deepened (e.g., in services markets). On the other hand, 
multilateral initiatives to reduce trade barriers, as well as competing regional integration blocs, 
might imply that the excess openness attributable to the IM may decline, all else equal. Thus, 
we have to find a balance between increasing integration among EU countries, resulting in 
higher international trade between them, and possible international developments affecting 
openness that are not directly related to the IM, but will affect the counterfactual world in which 
the EU and the IM would not exist. For this, we assume that these countervailing effects will 
balance out, such that the current effect of the IM on openness persists over time.    66 
This appears to be a reasonable compromise. First, the current effect of the IM on openness is 
low, compared to the effect realized over the whole period of IM considered. As a result, the 
long-run effects reported in Table 6.2 underestimate the long-run effects if we continue to 
attribute the market integration achieved by European economies over time to the IM, rather 
than arguing that the IM has partly been caught up by multilateral developments. After all, these 
market integration effects have historically developed from EU integration. Second, there is no 
clear answer to the question what would have happened in terms of multilateral liberalization 
without regional integration blocs such as the EU, and the question what will happen in the 
future in terms of either multilateral or EU integration can only be addressed tentatively. Thus, 
we choose to compute the effect of the current (viz., 2005) change in openness that can be 
contributed to the Internal Market on long-run income. 
Table 6.2  Effect of IM on openness and income levels 
  ∆openness
a
                      ∆GDP per capita
b
                          ∆GDP per capita
c 
                        (long run)                          (realised) 
    low  high  low  high 
           
Trade in goods
           
NL  8.2
d  3.7  14.8  4.0  6.3 
EU  4.9  2.2  8.8  2.2  3.3 
           
Trade in services           
NL  1.5  0.7  2.7  -  - 
EU  0.7  0.3  1.2  -  - 
 
a 
Trade (export plus import) as a percentage of GDP in 2005. 
b 
Percentage of GDP per capita on the steady-state growth path.
 
c 
Percentage of GDP per capita in 2005.
 
d 
Corrected for re-exports. 
 
Table 6.2 presents the effect of estimated changes in openness attributable to the internal market 
on income levels for goods and services trade. First, Table 6.2 presents estimates for the long-
run effect of the current level of openness that is induced by the Internal Market. The first 
column indicates that, for the Netherlands, we have excluded re-exports from goods trade for 
compiling openness changes due to the Internal Market. Re-exports are qualitatively different 
from exports from domestic production, in that they generate less direct value added per euro 
exported. As a result, it may be argued that the productivity and growth inducing effect of re-
exports is smaller as well. As a lower limit to these effects, we simply exclude re-exports from 
the calculation of openness changes that are relevant for assessing the income effects of goods 
trade for the Netherlands. 
For the EU as a whole, we do not exclude re-exports. First, only few data are available on 
re-exports for countries other than the Netherlands, and comparability is problematic. 
Furthermore, leaving out Dutch re-exports would imply that import flows for economies such as 
Germany are omitted as well. As final imports, these flows should be relevant for growth   67 
effects. Lastly, the distribution of these re-export flows across destinations is not directly 
observed. This complicates an appropriate treatment of re-export flows other than directly for 
the Netherlands. 
The second column contains the change in openness for 2005 resulting from increased 
export and import of, respectively, goods and services assigned to the current level of Internal 
Market integration. The third column presents the estimated increase in the long-run income 
levels, for the Netherlands and the EU, on the steady-state growth path, calculated using 
equation (6.3). For this purpose, the long-run parameter in equation (6.3) is multiplied by the 
induced change of openness in perunage points. The long-run parameter varies across the two 
scenarios used for deriving the income effects, from 0.45 in the low scenario to 1.8 in the high 
scenario. This last long-run parameter estimate falls within the range of plausible long-run 
income effects of openness reported in Nordas et al. (2006).
53 
The long-run income effect of the Netherlands, as a relatively open economy that enjoyed a 
higher increase in openness from Internal Market integration, is higher than the EU average. For 
goods trade, the effects are 14.8% and 8.8% of GDP per capita in the long run, respectively, in 
the high scenario. In the low scenario, these long-run effects are 3.7% and 2.2%, respectively. 
For services trade, the long-run income effects are much smaller. In Chapter 4 we have seen 
that the increase in services trade in 2005 due to the IM is considerably smaller still, than the 
effect on goods trade. Moreover, the share of services in total trade is substantially smaller than 
the share for goods. As a result, the increase in total openness (as a percentage of GDP) that is 
attributable to IM effects on services trade is much smaller than for goods trade. Using the same 
parameters from our growth regressions to calculate the income effect, the long-run effect in the 
high scenario is estimated to be 2.7% for the Netherlands and 1.2% for the EU. In the low 
scenario, long-run effects on income per capita are 0.7% and 0.3%, respectively. Given that the 
extent of market integration for services is still considerably less developed in the IM than for 
goods trade, future developments in EU liberalization of services trade may have a large 
potential to reduce trade costs and increase services trade. Moreover, it is likely that the 
reduction in relative trade costs, resulting from both technological progress and liberalization, 
will increase the share of services in total trade. This would increase the future impact of 
services liberalization within the IM on total openness to trade, and hence on per capita 
incomes. 
The long-run effects may only materialize over a considerable period of time. Given a 
convergence rate of λ = 0.01, which follows from the high scenario, it would take about 70 
years to get half-way to the steady state after a shock in openness has materialized. To put the 
long-run effect into perspective with respect to the income gains that have already materialized 
from the past decades of Internal Market integration, Table 6.2 subsequently presents estimates 
for the effects that have already materialized from past changes in openness due to the Internal 
 
53 According to Nordas et al. (2006) 1% point increase in openness (defined  as exports and imports divided by GDP) affects 
income by 0.9% to 3%.   68 
Market. Changes of openness over the period 1960-2000 have been used to compute the 
accumulated transitional effect on per capita income in 2005, using equation (6.2).
54 The 
transitional income effect is only presented for changes in total openness (as a percentage of 
GDP) arising from the IM effect on goods trade over time. The transitional income effects from 
increased services trade are negligible, because the period of measurement is too short for 
substantial income effects to have arisen yet. For the Netherlands, the gain in income estimated 
for 2005 from IM integration across 1960-2000 ranges from 4.0% to 6.3%, depending on the 
scenario. For the EU as a whole, the interval is smaller: from 2.2% to 3.3% of per capita 
income. 
 
54 Specifically, we have computed the change in openness due to the IM for the initial year of each panel-observation from 
1960-2000, and inserted these changes in openness into equation (6.2) to compute the effect on income per capita in 2005.   69 
7  Conclusions 
What has the Internal Market delivered after fifty years of market integration? With the concept 
Internal Market we refer to all integration activities in goods, services, capital and labour 
markets to deepen and to expand market integration. The Treaty of Rome describes market 
integration as a means of promoting prosperity in a broad sense.
55 Has the IM delivered 
prosperity? In this study we took the perspective of economists. What has market integration 
implied for incomes in Europe and, in particular, what has it implied for income in the 
Netherlands? Increased market integration implies more international economic cooperation, 
which is beneficial for stable political relations between countries. We do not consider these 
kinds of benefits here. Instead, we focus on the effects of market integration policies on trade in 
goods and services and on foreign direct investment. In addition, we estimate the income effects 
of EU market integration. 
 
We have aimed to identify the IM effects on top of other economic developments like 
globalisation. So, the shares of trade that we ascribe to the IM should be interpreted as 
additional to world-wide trends. Also without this IM effect, much trade would have taken 
place within Europe. The IM effects reported in this paper are merely the extra effect of IM 
policies on trade foreign investment and income. 
We have used panel estimation techniques for goods trade, services trade and foreign direct 
investment, examining both the development of bilateral trade and investment relations over 
time and the differences between countries pairs. In addition we have estimated the IM effect on 
other trade relations to account for substitution. 
According to our estimates, the Internal Market has had the largest impact on inward and 
outward FDI Stocks, both for in the EU and for the Netherlands. We have to be careful here, 
because a rigorous theoretical framework explaining bilateral FDI flows is lacking. One 
consequence of this shortcoming is that we cannot take into account substitution effects, like we 
did for trade in goods and services. The net effects of the IM on FDI are therefore likely to be 
lower than what we have reported. 
The share for goods trade which can be attributed to the IM is nearly as large as for FDI. 
The effects on services trade are smaller given the current stage of IM policies in which the 
Services Directive is not implemented. We have not studied the effects on labour migration 
because of the small migration flows within the EU.  
As a share of goods trade, the IM-effect has diminished over time. Trade openness has 
increased around the world and some IM policies on standards and NTBs are more and more 
common in trade liberalization deals involving non-EU countries. 
 
 
55 Dekker et al. (2007) discuss this objective more extensively.   70 
Table 7.1   Internal Market effects for the EU and the Netherlands  
Market integration area  EU25  Netherlands 
     
Goods exports  8  18 
Goods imports  8  12 
Services exports
a  5  5 
Services imports
a  5  6 
Inward FDI stocks  17  18 
Outward FDI stocks  11  15 
 
Numbers are percentages of total goods exports, imports services trade etc for the EU and the Netherlands for the year 2005. 
a For services, the EU is EU15. For FDI, EU does not include these non-OECD countries: Baltic States, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia.  
The Dutch numbers for goods are corrected for re-exports. 
 
The trade-enhancing effects of the IM for goods and services is estimated to have increased 
GDP by  about 3 percent of GDP for the EU and 6 percent for the Netherlands. This implies a 
2200 euro rise in GDP per capita in the Netherlands. In a more conservative scenario in which 
openness has less effect on income, the income effects are 2 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
For the Netherlands we have excluded re-exports from trade for compiling openness changes 
due to the Internal Market because re-exports generate much less value added per euro 
exported. 
According to our estimations about half of the potential income gains of the current stage of 
IM integration have been realized until now. The other part will be realized the coming decades 
due to reallocation, productivity improvements and innovation. These movements are already 
triggered by IM integration but take a long time before they are materialized. Then the GDP 
effect for the EU could add up to nearly 10% and of the Netherlands to 17%.  
The income effects of more FDI are very modest.
56 First of all FDI, flows and stocks are at 
most 10% of the total investment flows and capital stock in Europe. Second, capital market 
integration implied more FDI inflows and outflows. The net effect is much smaller. This does 
not explain all effects, because the underlying premise is that the extra FDI inflows and 
outflows are more productively used. A net FDI approach would underestimate these effects. 
Third, the changes in FDI stocks are gross effects because we could not estimate the possible 
substitution effects as explained in section 5. The economic literature does also not find 
substantial effects of more capital market integration in developed economies. Fourth, openness 
for trade and FDI are often intertwined. It is possible that in estimating the income effects of 




56 A back of the envelope estimate suggests that the income effects of extra FDI is about 1%. Take the long term estimate 
on investment in table 6.1, third column. This is 2.6 (= 0.13/(1-0.95). Assume that the 18% increase in FDI stocks can be 
translated into an 18% increase in FDI flows. FDI flows are about 10% of total investment and the I/Y ratio is 0.2. Then the 
I/Y ratio increase by 0.36% points. Multiplying with 2.6 delivers about 1% income gain.   71 
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Appendix 1: Description of the data 
Trade in goods 
Data on bilateral trade were obtained from the International Trade in Commodity Statistics 
(ITCS) database using the OECD’s website. The ITCS database is maintained by the OECD 
and the UNSD. Data on all countries was retrieved and most developing countries were 
aggregated by (sub-)continent in order reduce the number of zero trade flows and to focus on 
the OECD. As a rule reported imports were used as the primary source. When a country did not 
report any imports for a specific partner, the exports reported by the partner were used in stead.  
An important exception to this rule has been made for all intra-EU trade flows from 1992 
onwards. The establishment of the Single Market in that year had the side effect that data on 
intra-EU trade no longer could be collected from customs forms. Instead, trade statistics are 
gathered from data on value-added tax, the so-called INTRASTAT methodology. Due to 
sensitivity to fraud and other factors, intra-EU trade statistics suffered (and still suffer) from 
under-reporting. Because reported imports turn out to be more affected by underreporting than 
reported exports, the latter kind of data were used as a primary source for intra-EU trade from 
1992 onwards. (In many cases, underreporting was so large that reported exports even exceeded 
reported imports despite the cif/fob difference.) The median cif/fob ratios in the years 
immediately prior to 1992 were used to correct for this exceptional treatment of INTRASTAT 
data. 
Bilateral data on Dutch re-exports and re-imports were based on the approximations made 
by Mellens et al. (2007) (Statistics Netherlands does not (yet) publish bilateral re-exports and 
re-imports data.) They derive their approximation by combining time series data on total Dutch 
re-exports and re-imports with data on the sectoral composition of re-exports and re-imports 
available for recent years only. 
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Table 7.2  List of countries and aggregates (trade in goods) 
Australia  Malta  Extended sample: 
Austria  Netherlands  Argentina 
Belgium and Luxembourg  New Zealand  Australia 
Bulgaria  Norway incl. S. & JM. excl. Bouvet   Brazil 
Canada  Poland  Chile 
Cyprus  Portugal  China 
Denmark  Romania  India 
Finland  Spain  Indonesia 
Fmr. Czechoslovakia  Sweden  Mexico 
Fmr. USSR  Switzerland incl. Liechtenstein  South Africa 
Fmr. Yugoslavia  Turkey  Sri Lanka 
France incl. Monaco & overseas  USA incl. PR. & Virgin Isds.  Suriname 
Germany  United Kingdom  Thailand 
Greece    Venezuela 
Hungary  Aggregates:  Zimbabwe 
Iceland  East Asia and Pacific   
Ireland  Latin America and Carribean   
Italy incl. San Marino & Vatican  Middle-East and North Africa   
Japan  South Asia   
Korea, Rep. of   Subsaharan Africa   
 
Gross Domestic Product and Value Added 
The primary source for data on nominal GDP and value added is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) CD rom (edition 2007). For several (European) countries, the 
WDI does not contain data on GDP in the earlier years of the sample. In particular, no GDP 
data was reported for West Germany prior to 1971. In these cases, additional data from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database was used to lengthen the series, scaling 
the IFS data to avoid structural breaks.   81 
Appendix 2: Choice of spline intervals for trade in goods 
Chapter 3 studies how the IM has affected the trade in goods over time using a spline (a 
“flexible trend”) for EU-members. The choice of the years at which the slope of the spline is 
allowed to change is determined ex-ante and influences the precision with which IM-effect is 
measured. Estimating a cross-section gravity equation for all years separately can give an idea 
of how the EU-membership has affected trade over the years. A repeated cross-section, 
however, turns out to produce coefficients on the EU-dummy that are highly volatile. 
A less volatile alternative is a so-called rolling regression. This involves estimating a 
(pooled) regression on a fixed number of subsequent years or “window”, shifting the window 
for each regression by adding a later year to and dropping the first year from the previous 
sample. A rolling regression is thus similar to a moving average. 
Figure 7.1 shows the results of a rolling regression of bilateral trade on the log of importer 
GDP plus the log of exporter GDP, the log of distance, dummies for common-border and 
common language, and an EU dummy.
57 The figure shows the estimated coefficient of the EU 
dummy for a three-year window, a five-year window, and a seven-year window. The vertical 
lines indicate the chosen breakpoints for the slope of EU spline. 































3-year window 5-year window 7-year window
 
a
 Vertical lines indicate the breakpoints chosen for the spline. 
 
 
57 Data on distance, common border and common language were obtained from the website of CEPII.   82 
After the observed peak in 1970, a steep decline sets in until 1974. A possible explanation for 
this trough is the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the oil crisis of 1973. The second oil 
crisis (1979) might also have left a mark on intra-EU trade. These results are robust to including 
a generic dummy for the years 1971 to 1974   83 
Appendix 3: Robustness of calculations on 
counterfactual trade 
Trade in goods 
All results presented in the main text were based on the method for calculating counterfactual 
trade proposed by Straathof (2008). Table 7.3 compares this method (SYS) with two other 
approaches. First, the “conventional” method of “setting the EU dummy to zero” without taking 
into account trade diversion, yields a consistently higher proportion of Dutch trade that is due to 
the IM, than the SYS approach. The other method is Bonus Vetus with GDP weights (BVO-
GDP) as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007a). This linear approximation consistently 
leads to smaller IM-effects.  
Table 7.3  Share of Dutch exports and imports due to the IM: robustness of trade diversion calculation 
Year  Conventional                    Total effect                      Expansion effect 
    SYS  BV-GDP  Traditional  SYS  BV-GDP 
Exports             
2005  0.22  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.08  0.02 
             
1961-2005  0.25  0.21  0.14  0.08  0.06  0.02 
             
1961-1969  0.14  0.12  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1970-1972  0.23  0.20  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1973-1983  0.23  0.19  0.14  0.06  0.05  0.01 
1984-1991  0.30  0.24  0.17  0.08  0.06  0.02 
1992-1997  0.28  0.23  0.15  0.08  0.06  0.02 
1998-2005  0.23  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.07  0.02 
 
Imports 
2005  0.16  0.12  0.07  0.06  0.03  -0.01 
             
1961-2005  0.20  0.16  0.10  0.06  0.04  0.00 
             
1961-1969  0.14  0.11  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1970-1972  0.21  0.17  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1973-1983  0.18  0.14  0.09  0.04  0.03  0.00 
1984-1991  0.25  0.19  0.12  0.05  0.04  0.00 
1992-1997  0.24  0.18  0.11  0.07  0.04  0.01 
1998-2005  0.18  0.13  0.08  0.07  0.04  0.00 
 
“Conventional” ignores trade diversion; “SYS” is the method used in the main text; “BV-GDP” refers to Bonus Vetus with GDP weights 
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Appendix 4: Robustness of estimation results 
Trade in goods 
Bun and Klaassen (2007) criticised studies of the effect of the Euro on trade (e.g. Frankel and 
Rose (2002)) for their failure to take into account trends in residuals. If residuals of a gravity 
equation exhibit an upward trend, then including a dummy for a discrete event, like the 
introduction of the Euro, then that dummy will have a positive coefficient even when the 
discrete event has had no impact on trade. Bun and Klaassen showed that the introduction of the 
Euro has had hardly any effect on trade once a trend was added for each pair of countries. 
The case of the IM, however, differs from the case of the Euro as the construction of the IM 
has not been a discrete event, but a gradual one. Including pair wise trends would not work 
when measuring such a gradual effect because most genuine IM-effects would be filtered out. 
Nevertheless, the criticism of Bun and Klaassen implies that any trend in the residuals 
should not be larger for EU-members than for other countries. Figure 7.2 displays the average 
residuals per year for EU6 countries and for all other countries. The underlying regression 
model has a single spline for all members of the EU (model (1) of Table 3.2). The figure shows 
that there is no trend in the mean residuals of EU6 countries, nor for the mean of the rest. The 
mean residuals are higher for the EU6 because of the inclusion of pair wise fixed effects. 


















































EU6 non-EU6  
All estimation results presented in the main text relied on bi-annual country dummies as a 
means to control for multilateral resistance. It is also possible to transform variables prior to 
estimation as proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007a) and Straathof (2008). Table 7.4   85 
compares the dummy method (1) with Baier and Bergstrand’s GDP-weighted transformation 
(4), Baier and Bergstrand’s n-weighted transformation (5), Straathof’s system approach (3), and 
Straathof’s system approach instrumented with BVO-n transformed variables (2). The 
transformations proposed by Baier and Bergstrand outperform the other models in terms of 
significance and have coefficients close to those of the dummy model. 
Table 7.4  Estimation results for transformed variables 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
                       
GDP    0.52  ***  0.20    0.77  ***  0.60  ***  0.60  *** 
    (0.01)    (0.26)    (0.02)    (0.09)    (0.09)   
                       
EU  1961-1969  2.24  ***  2.98  ***  2.67  ***  2.24  ***  2.60  *** 
    (0.23)    (0.24)    (0.57)    (0.27)    (0.26)   
                       
  1970-1972  - 4.18  ***  -3.72  ***  - 5.27  **  - 4.71  ***  - 5.26  *** 
    (0.98)    (0.66)    (1.98)    (1.01)    (0.94)   
                       
  1973-1983  0.84  **  0.31    0.96  *  0.92  ***  0.92  *** 
    (0.29)    (0.26)    (0.40)    (0.25)    (0.23)   
                       
  1984-1991  0.17    0.62    - 0.22    - 0.09    - 0.06   
    (0.23)    (0.38)    (0.46)    (0.23)    (0.20)   
                       
  1992-1997  - 0.42    - 2.61  ***  - 0.80    - 1.02  ***  - 0.62  * 
    (0.37)    (0.40)    (0.58)    (0.27)    (0.29)   
                       
  1998-2005  - 0.96  ***  - 0.48    - 0.96    - 1.34  ***  - 1.22  *** 
    (0.27)    (0.43)    (0.52)    (0.22)    (0.27)   
                       
Transformation  none    SYS    SYS    BVO-GDP    BVO-n   
Country-year dummies  yes    no    no    no    no   
Year dummies  no    yes    yes    yes    yes   
Instruments  none    BVO-n    none    none    none   
                       
N*T    51586    51586    51586    51586    51586   
# parameters  799    51    1457    51    51   
R
2-adj.    0.83    0.77    0.77    0.75    0.75   
 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% **1% and ***0.1%. 
 
The countries chosen for the base sample are mainly OECD countries and Middle and Eastern 
European countries (see the first two columns of Table 7.2). All other trade flows are 
aggregated by (sub-) continent for two reasons. First, in this way a set of relatively homogenous 
countries is created, such that bias due to unobserved country characteristics is limited. Second, 
because it reduces the number of zero-trade flows. 
In order to test for the sensitivity of our main results, the base sample is extended with the 
major developing countries (listed in the third column of Table 7.2). Table 7.5 compares 
regression results for the two samples. The models (1), (2), (4) are results for the base sample 
presented earlier and have been included for reference only.    86 
Model (3) refers to estimation with n-weighted Bonus Vetus transformed variables using the 
extended sample. In comparison with model (2), coefficients tend to be closer to zero and have 
larger standard errors. The sign is the same for both models except for the period 1984-1991. 
Model (5) refers to estimation with variables transformed by Straathof’s system approach 
using the extended sample. Compared with the base sample (4), coefficients again tend to be 
closer to zero and less significant. 
Do these results suggest that using the base sample leads overestimation of the EU effect? Not 
necessarily. A number of large developing countries have experienced rapid economic growth 
in combination with substantial trade liberalization. This has stimulated trade with and between 
these countries. Failure to control for this process of catching up is likely to have blurred the EU 
effect in regressions using the extended sample. 
Table 7.5  Estimation results for extended sample of countries 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
                       
GDP    0.52  ***  0.60  ***  0.62  ***  0.77  ***  0.84  *** 
    (0.01)    (0.09)    (0.08)    (0.02)    (0.02)   
                       
EU  1961-1969  2.24  ***  2.60  ***  1.90  ***  2.67  ***  2.00  ** 
    (0.23)    (0.26)    (0.41)    (0.57)    (0.70)   
                       
  1970-1972  - 4.18  ***  -5.26  ***  - 3.02  *  - 5.27  **  - 2.71   
    (0.98)    (0.94)    (1.45)    (1.98)    (2.39)   
                       
  1973-1983  0.84  **  0.92  ***  0.53    0.96  *  0.46   
    (0.29)    (0.23)    (0.33)    (0.40)    (0.48)   
                       
  1984-1991  0.17    -0.06    0.52    - 0.22    0.29   
    (0.23)    (0.20)    (0.29)    (0.46)    (0.54)   
                       
  1992-1997  - 0.42    -0.62  *  - 0.37    - 0.80    - 0.43   
    (0.37)    (0.29)    (0.33)    (0.58)    (0.66)   
                       
  1998-2005  - 0.96  ***  -1.22  ***  - 0.41    - 0.96    - 0.27   
    (0.27)    (0.27)    (0.27)    (0.52)    (0.57)   
                       
Transformation  no    BVO-n    BVO-n    SYS    SYS   
Country-year dummies  yes    no    no    no    no   
Year dummies  no    yes    yes    yes    yes   
Instruments  none    none    none    BVO-n    BVO-n   
Sample size  base    base    extended    base    extended   
                       
N*T    51586    51586    88819    51586    88819   
N    1406    1406    2550    1406    2550   
# parameters  799    51    51    1457    2601   
R
2-adj.    0.83    0.75    0.63    0.77    0.66   
                       
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% **1% and ***0.1%. 
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Appendix 5: The extended Solow growth model 
The Solow growth model still provides the background for much of the empirical literature on 
economic growth. We briefly present an extended Solow model for the purpose of deriving the 
growth regression equation specified in the paper. For a more detailed description, see Mankiw 
et al. (1992); Islam (1995a). The derivations below are most closely based on Islam (1995a). 
The Solow model 
In the Solow model, aggregate output of an economy at a given point in time, t, (Y) is 
determined as a function of labour (L), capital (K), and efficiency in production (A). The factor 
A is denoted total factor productivity (TFP) and is determined by the level of technological 
knowledge, institutions, climate, openness to trade, education, and other more or less tangible 
factors. The basic growth model is usually formulated mathematically using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
, ) ( 1 a a - = t t t t L A K Y   (1) 
where α is the elasticity of output with respect to capital and lies between 0 and 1. 
 
The model takes the average annual growth of labour as determined exogenously, and denoted 
by n. Similarly, the average annual growth of technological knowledge (driving the long-run 
development of TFP) is assumed exogenous, and denoted as g. Using these features, we can 
express the variables in terms of “effective worker units” by dividing through with AL. We 
denote these reformulated variables by lower case letters with tilde. 
Due to the diminishing marginal product of capital, the model economy moves to a steady 
state, in which investments in capital per effective worker exactly compensate for the rate of 
depreciation (δ), and the exogenous growth in effective labour (n+g). As a result, steady-state 
growth in income per capita is totally determined by the pace of exogenous technological 
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where I/Y stands for the exogenous investment rate. 
This steady-state equation can be the basis for empirical analysis of per capita income 
differences across countries. However, it requires us to assume that countries are in their steady 
state at any given point in time (or deviate from it only randomly). Most of the empirical growth   88 
studies instead use a generalization of the equation that describes the behaviour of income 
levels out of their steady-state growth path, using a first order Taylor series approximation 
around the steady state (see Islam (1995a)). 
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The equation above implies that the economy, roughly speaking, closes a fraction lambda of the 
gap to the steady state each year, where lambda equals (n+g+δ)(1–α). This implies that the 
level of income per effective worker at a point t in time can be described as follows: 
0
* ~ ln ~ ln ) 1 ( ~ ln y e y e y t t
t
l l - - + - = ,   (4) 
where t0 denotes the initial period considered. Substituting in the determinants of steady state 
income per effective labor unit yields: 
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This equation could be estimated empirically, if it were not for the fact that income per effective 
worker cannot be observed directly. Usually, therefore, the equation is expressed in terms of per 
capita income levels for estimation, using that per capita income equals: 
gt
t t t t e A y A y y 0 ~ ~ × = × º .  (6) 
The equation describing per capita income at time t becomes: 
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  (7) 
Extending the Solow model: education and openness as determinants of 
TFP 
For our purpose, we extend the Solow model, by explicitly including openness to international 
trade as a determinant of total factor productivity. Moreover, we follow Islam (1995a) in 
including human capital as a further determinant of productivity as well. Including openness as 
well as human capital, the growth regression specified in the main text of Chapter 6 is in line 
with the main core determinants of income per capita considered in the growth regression 
literature.   89 
We re-specify the production function to explicitly include human capital (reflected by two 
measures of educational attainment) and openness to international trade. 
, ) ( 1 t O
t t t t t t e sedu predu L A K Y × - ¢ = j n m a a   (8) 
where predu and sedu are primary and secondary schooling attainment rates, and O stands for 
openness to international trade (total trade as a perunage of GDP). As we have filtered the 
contribution of education and openness from total factor productivity, the variable A’ reflects 
other productivity determinants (most notably the state of technological knowledge). 
Assuming steady-state levels of educational attainment (cf. Islam (1995a)) and openness, 
equation (7) can now be reformulated into: 
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  (9) 
The estimations in the main text of Chapter 6 drop the restrictions on the regression parameters 
that emerge from the Solow model, leaving them free to be determined separately. This leads to 
the following growth regression equation that largely corresponds to equation (6.1): 
t it i i
i i i i i it
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predu n Y I y y
h e g b
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  (10) 
To derive the long-run parameters used to assess steady-state effects, we note that income per 
effective worker is constant in the steady state. Hence, we can reformulate the model for the 
steady state, such that: 
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Since we assume that the growth of technological knowledge is exogenous, the derivative of 
steady state income per capita (in logs) with respect to trade openness follows directly (cf. 
Frankel and Rose (2002)).   90 
 